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FROM SECURITIES TO CYBERSECURITY: 
THE SEC ZEROES IN ON CYBERSECURITY 
Abstract: Cybersecurity is one of the gravest threats facing public companies, 
the markets, and the economy at large today. Because of this pressing threat, the 
SEC has increased its attention to cybersecurity. In 2018 interpretive guidance, 
consistent with the mandatory disclosure regime established by federal securities 
regulation, the SEC stipulated that public companies have a duty to disclose 
those cybersecurity risks and incidents that are material to investors. The 2018 
guidance added little, however, and instead parroted earlier guidance from the 
SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance. Moreover, the SEC itself has been 
plagued by cybersecurity problems. This Note asserts that to regulate cybersecu-
rity effectively, the SEC must both strengthen its own cybersecurity and further 
expand upon, rather than simply repeat, the obligation of public companies to 
disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 30, 2018, Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”), the 
largest hotel company in the world, publicly disclosed a breach of its Starwood 
guest reservation database in a Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the “Commis-
sion”).1 Marriott revealed that the cybersecurity incident, which implicated the 
sensitive personal information of nearly four hundred million guests, dated to 
September 2014.2 The Marriott cybersecurity incident was one of the largest in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Marriott Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 30, 2018); Francine McKenna, Marriott’s 
Starwood Breach Raises Questions About Meeting SEC Standards for Cybersecurity Disclosure, 
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/Marriotts-starwood-breach-
raises-questions-about-meeting-sec-standards-for-cybersecurity-disclosure-2018-11-30 [https://perma.
cc/S8W7-ZAPF]. Guests of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. (“Starwood”) properties 
input sensitive personal information into the Starwood guest reservation system to secure their reser-
vations at Marriott properties. See Marriott Int’l, Inc., Exhibit 99 to Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 
30, 2018) (noting that the Starwood reservation database houses Starwood guests’ personal infor-
mation). Pursuant to the mandatory disclosure regime implemented by the federal securities laws, 
public companies are required to file a Current Report on Form 8-K with the SEC to report the exist-
ence of certain material events, such as amendments to governance documents, entry into certain 
material agreements, or voting results from the annual meeting of the shareholders. Fast Answers: 
Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8k
htm.html [https://perma.cc/FRG3-UG9F]; see 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2020) (explaining that the Form 
8-K is to be filed pursuant to a company’s disclosure obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). 
 2 McKenna, supra note 1; Marriott Provides Update on Starwood Database Security Incident, 
MARRIOTT INT’L NEWS CTR. (Jan. 4, 2019), http://news.Marriott.com/2019/01/Marriott-provides-
update-on-starwood-database-security-incident [https://perma.cc/32BA-9DQ4]. Marriott revealed that 
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history, exceeded only by the mammoth breach of Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo!”) in 
2013 and 2014.3 Marriott and Yahoo! are not alone in facing the cybersecurity 
threat; it is one of the most pressing concerns in corporate boardrooms around 
the world.4 
Marriott’s eventual disclosure of the Starwood breach has strong implica-
tions for recent SEC guidance regarding cybersecurity-related disclosures.5 
Although it learned of the breach in September 2018, Marriott did not disclose 
                                                                                                                           
in September 2018 it learned that unsanctioned access to the Starwood network enabled an unap-
proved user to access and copy encrypted user information. Marriott Int’l, Inc., Exhibit 99 to Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 30, 2018). Some of the personal information implicated included guest 
names, dates of birth, passport numbers, and payment information. Id. The hackers gained access to 
the system in 2014, although Marriott only learned of the breach in 2018, two years after its acquisi-
tion of Starwood. McKenna, supra note 1; see Marriott International to Acquire Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts Worldwide, Creating the World’s Largest Hotel Company, MARRIOTT BONVOY (Nov. 16, 
2015), https://marriott.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/marriott-international-acquire-
starwood-hotels-resorts-worldwide [https://perma.cc/7R4D-8HGY] (announcing the transaction be-
tween Marriott and Starwood, and indicating its expected closing in the middle of 2016). 
 3 Kirsten Grind & Dustin Volz, Marriott Says Hackers Swiped Millions of Passport Numbers, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/Marriott-says-hackers-swiped-millions-of-
passport-numbers-11546605000/?mod=mktw [https://perma.cc/NW2F-36YK]. The breach of Yahoo! 
implicated more than one billion accounts. William Pierotti, Cyber Babel: Finding the Lingua Franca 
in Cybersecurity Regulation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 406 (2018). At the time Yahoo! disclosed the 
breaches, it was in talks to be acquired by Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”). See id. (describ-
ing the effect of the breach on Verizon’s eventual acquisition of Yahoo!). Because of the Yahoo! 
breaches, Verizon reduced its suggested purchase price from $4.83 billion to $4.48 billion. Id. (noting 
that the $350 million decrease represented a seven percent reduction in purchase price). For further 
discussion of the Yahoo! breach and subsequent SEC enforcement action, see infra notes 137–141 and 
accompanying text. 
 4 See Chenxi Wang, Corporate Boards Are Snatching Up Cybersecurity Talents, FORBES (Aug. 
30, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chenxiwang/2019/08/30/corporate-boards-are-snatching-up-
cybersecurity-talents/#29cfbdb5479f [https://perma.cc/8JTQ-3YB4] (noting that corporate boards are 
shoring up their cybersecurity governance and expertise in response to the growing threat of cyberse-
curity incidents and pressure from investors); Business E-Mail Compromise: The 12 Billion Dollar 
Scam, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (July 12, 2018), https://www.ic3.gov/media/2018/180712.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9X2H-XFKC] (noting that more than seventy-eight thousand “business e-mail com-
promises” have caused more than $12.5 billion in fraud losses since 2013). The “business e-mail 
compromise” is a scam targeting companies that conduct payments via wire transfer. Business E-Mail 
Compromise: The 12 Billion Dollar Scam, supra. Moreover, businesses are not the only affected par-
ties; individual users are similarly affected. See id. (identifying more than forty thousand individual 
victims of “business e-mail compromise” scams). 
 5 McKenna, supra note 1. The delay between when the breaches occurred and Marriott’s eventual 
disclosure of the breaches raises questions about the timeliness of the disclosure under the SEC’s new 
guidance. See id. (questioning whether Marriott informed investors of the cybersecurity incidents in a 
timely manner); see also Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity 
Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 33-10459, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166, 8167 (Feb. 26, 2018) (articulat-
ing the SEC’s position that public companies are obligated to disclose cybersecurity risk of material 
significance to their investors in a “timely fashion”). Although the SEC reinforced the need for timely 
disclosure of cybersecurity risks, it did not expound on what makes disclosure “timely.” See Commis-
sion Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8167 
(providing only that companies must endeavor to provide timely disclosure). 
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the breach in filings with the SEC until the end of November 2018, raising 
questions as to whether the disclosure was timely under the SEC guidance.6 
Federal securities regulation encompasses twin pursuits: the regulation of 
securities exchanges and investor protection.7 These pursuits underlie the 
statutory framework of securities regulations, established principally by the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“Exchange Act” and, together, the “Acts”).8 Pursuant to the authority 
granted to the Commission to regulate the securities industry, the SEC has de-
veloped a regulatory framework predicated on mandatory disclosure.9 Alt-
hough its efficacy is debated, disclosure is thought to promote market efficien-
cy and ensure a well-informed investing population.10 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Marriott Int’l, Inc., Exhibit 99 to Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 30, 2018) (disclosing at 
the end of November 2018 the existence of a massive breach to the Starwood reservation database to 
which the company was alerted on September 8, 2018); Shivaram Rajgopal & Bugra Gezer, The Mar-
riott Breach Shows Just How Inadequate Cyber Risk Disclosures Are, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/03/the-marriott-breach-shows-just-how-inadequate-cyber-risk-disclosures-are 
[https://perma.cc/T4DV-4D5B] (arguing that a lack of definition of “timely” in the SEC’s guidance on 
cybersecurity disclosure enabled the delay in Marriott’s disclosure of its breach to the SEC and inves-
tors). Significant litigation ensued: On January 11, 2019, 176 plaintiffs from across the United States 
initiated class action proceedings in Maryland federal court. Joyce Hanson, Marriott Hit with Another 
Suit Over Starwood Data Breach, LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123
696/marriott-hit-with-another-suit-over-starwood-data-breach [https://perma.cc/2QH7-6QLQ]; see also 
Dave Simpson, 11 Marriott Data Breach Suits Moved to Maryland for MDL, LAW360 (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1126573/11-marriott-data-breach-suits-moved-to-maryland-for-mdl 
[https://perma.cc/669T-KFU7] (describing the complexity of the judicial proceedings). 
 7 See Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 390 (2014) (noting that the federal secu-
rities laws aim to protect investors by ridding the exchanges of abusive misconduct). 
 8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78qq (2018)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728–29 (1975) (describing the 
history and purpose of the Acts). The purpose of the Securities Act was to ensure complete and accu-
rate disclosure of securities offered for sale in interstate commerce and to protect against abusive 
behavior. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728. The Exchange Act purported both to regulate and pro-
tect against abusive practices in the securities exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) trading markets 
operating in interstate commerce. Id. 
 9 See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728–29 (noting that Section 4(a) of the Exchange Act created 
the SEC); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723 (1984) (identifying mandatory disclosure as the original premise 
upon which federal securities regulation was predicated). Mandatory disclosure seeks to ensure that 
SEC issuers provide investors with all material information pertaining to their investments. Daniel M. 
Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Society of Corporate Secretaries & 
Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071113dmghtm 
[https://perma.cc/3CCW-N2WJ] (noting that the premise of the mandatory disclosure regime is to 
enable investors to make intelligent investment decisions). 
 10 See Lauren M. Mastronardi, Note, Shining the Light a Little Brighter: Should Item 303 Serve as 
a Basis for Liability Under Rule 10b-5?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 343 (2016) (describing why dis-
closure is utilized in the securities regulation context and highlighting the debate over its efficacy). 
Mandatory disclosure improves efficiency in the market because increasing the market’s supply of 
accurate information ensures that investors are best situated to make informed decisions about invest-
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Recently, the SEC has begun to focus its regulatory efforts on cybersecu-
rity, recognizing that it is of concern to all companies in its regulatory jurisdic-
tion, regardless of industry or type of entity.11 In 2011, the SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance issued guidance pertaining to the disclosure of cybersecu-
rity risks and incidents in SEC filings.12 The 2011 guidance did not generate 
any new reporting obligations, but rather reaffirmed public companies’ obliga-
tion to disclose material information to their investors, which may include cy-
bersecurity risks and incidents.13 In February 2018, the SEC issued interpretive 
guidance pertaining to the disclosure obligations of companies that it regulates 
with respect to cybersecurity risks and incidents.14 The 2018 guidance further 
developed the Division of Corporation Finance’s 2011 guidance.15 
Some critics of this approach argue that the SEC should go beyond the 
mandatory disclosure regime to regulate cybersecurity through more proactive 
means, whereas others recognize that cybersecurity risks and incidents are crit-
ical information about which investors need to be informed.16 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
ment opportunities. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1984). 
 11 See Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Cybersecurity (Sept. 20, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-09-20 [https://perma.cc/
V7J3-S4PC] (emphasizing the SEC’s commitment to regulating “cybersecurity risks and incidents” 
and taking care that market participants are adequately informed regarding such risks and incidents). 
 12 See Div. of Corp. Fin., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2: Cybersecurity, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-
topic2.htm [https://perma.cc/78WD-S6D9] (outlining the cybersecurity disclosure requirements de-
veloped by the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance). The Division of Corporation Finance works 
to equip investors with “material information in order to make informed investment decisions.” About 
the Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/cfabout.shtml [https://perma.cc/5UME-8X3N]. In pursuit of this goal, the Division 
reviews select filings with the SEC and issues interpretative guidance regarding SEC rules and form. 
Id. 
 13 See Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity: Should the SEC Be Sticking Its 
Nose Under This Tent?, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 35, 45–49 (describing the content and im-
plications of the 2011 guidance). The guidance was issued by the SEC’s Division of Corporation 
Finance, but it did not have the force of law. See id. at 46 & n.96 (noting that the 2011 guidance was 
not issued by the SEC through the notice and comment procedures required to promulgate a regula-
tion); infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8167 (discussing guidance updates to the cybersecurity disclosure requirements articulat-
ed by the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance in 2011). 
 15 See id. (noting that the 2018 guidance “reinforc[es] and expand[s]” on the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance’s 2011 guidance). 
 16 See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Commission Statement 
and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/statement-stein-2018-02-21#_ednref1 [https://perma.cc/UG3Q-JKHJ] (sug-
gesting that the SEC should go further than simply requiring disclosure); see also Commission State-
ment and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8171 (describing 
disclosure controls and procedures that the SEC believes public companies should adopt). Former 
SEC Commissioner Kara Stein proposed pursuing notice and comment rulemaking on more proactive 
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SEC has confirmed that disclosure obligations imposed on entities regulated 
by the SEC include disclosure of cybersecurity incidents, the Commission’s 
2018 guidance merely repeats, rather than further develops, a public compa-
ny’s disclosure obligations.17 The more recent guidance also underestimates 
the difficulty in providing this disclosure without compromising sensitive cor-
porate information, a challenge that is compounded by the SEC’s own cyber-
security challenges.18 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of federal securities regulation, 
the history of and disclosure requirements related to the SEC’s regulation of 
cybersecurity, and the underlying rationale of the mandatory disclosure re-
gime.19 Part II of this Note addresses the implications of the SEC’s regulation 
of cybersecurity, and considers whether the SEC should be regulating in this 
space, and if so, whether mandatory disclosure is the most effective means by 
which the SEC can assert oversight.20 Finally, Part III of this Note argues that 
although the SEC has rightly chosen to regulate cybersecurity, to be effective 
                                                                                                                           
cybersecurity measures, such as minimum standards that SEC-regulated entities should abide by to 
protect sensitive consumer information. Stein, supra. Notice and comment is part of the procedure by 
which the SEC, in addition to other federal agencies, exercises its rulemaking authority. Investor Bul-
letin: Suggestions for How Individual Investors Can Comment on SEC Rulemaking, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_
secrulemaking [https://perma.cc/2JQU-3V66]. Before promulgating final rules, the SEC will publish a 
notice with a proposal for a rule and will subsequently seek comment from the public. Id. Members of 
the public likely to provide comments include individual investors, law firms, and regulated entities, 
among others. See SEC Proposed Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed.shtml [https://perma.cc/D6WB-FJXU] (making available a list of proposed rules con-
sidered by the SEC, as well as comments received for proposed rules whose comment period has 
closed). The SEC considers the public comments and then promulgates the final version of the rule. 
Investor Bulletin: Suggestions for How Individual Investors Can Comment on SEC Rulemaking, su-
pra. 
 17 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8168–69 (noting that the companies must disclose material information pertaining to 
cybersecurity incidents, but need not include sensitive corporate information in such disclosures). 
Along with the disclosure content explicitly mandated by SEC regulations, public companies must 
disclose all “material information” necessary to ensure that the statements being made are not mis-
leading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court, the SEC considers 
information to be material if it is substantially likely that a reasonable investor would view the infor-
mation as important to her investment decision, or if the reasonable investor would have considered 
disclosure of the information as having substantially changed the total volume of information availa-
ble to him or her. Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclo-
sures, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8168 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 18 See Steve W. Klemash et al., Cybersecurity Disclosure Benchmarking, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 21, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/21/
cybersecurity-disclosure-benchmarking/ [https://perma.cc/398N-SW25] (noting the difficulties faced 
by issuers in providing adequate disclosure while also not revealing sensitive information that could 
make its way to nefarious parties). For a discussion of the 2016 breach of an SEC database, see infra 
note 119 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 22–141 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 142–187 and accompanying text. 
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in its efforts it must further clarify the substance and timing of disclosures of 
cybersecurity risks and incidents as well as shore up its own cybersecurity.21 
I. SEC REGULATION: WHERE IT HAS BEEN AND WHERE IT IS GOING 
Federal regulation of securities emerged in response to the Great Depres-
sion.22 Through the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the SEC has estab-
lished a regulatory regime predicated upon mandatory disclosure.23 Since the 
initial enactment of the federal securities laws in the early twentieth century, 
the SEC has further developed this regulatory scheme.24 Section A of this Part 
traces the history of federal securities regulation in the United States.25 Section 
B of this Part presents the underlying rationale of mandatory disclosure, the 
regime upon which federal securities regulation is premised.26 Section C de-
tails the regulation of cybersecurity by the SEC.27 
A. The 1929 Stock Market Crash Leads to the Establishment  
of Federal Securities Regulation 
Before the Great Depression, the federal government had little involve-
ment in the regulation of the securities markets.28 Following the 1929 stock 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 188–215 and accompanying text. 
 22 See, e.g., Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639–40 (2017) (describing the initiation of federal 
securities regulation in the United States and noting that the “rampant abuses” in securities exchanges 
that caused the 1929 stock market crash pushed Congress to enact the federal securities laws). See 
generally Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduc-
tion to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 
(1988). For a more detailed description of the initial enactment of the federal securities laws, see infra 
notes 28–33 and accompany text. 
 23 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (requiring continuous disclosure after the initial public 
offering of securities to the market); Securities Act of 1933 (requiring disclosure upon the initial pub-
lic offering of securities); Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 336 (noting that securities regulation was 
premised upon disclosure from the outset). 
 24 See, e.g., Adoption of the Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, 47 
Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982) (adopting a scheme of integrated disclosure to eliminate 
redundancies in the reporting obligations under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934). For a detailed discussion of the SEC’s adoption of an integrated disclosure 
scheme, see infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 28–73 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 84–141 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Re-
flections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869 (2003) (describing President Theodore Roose-
velt’s call for stronger regulation of corporations); What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/FG4A-ZVP6] (noting that in the 
period before the Great Depression there was negligible federal oversight of the securities markets in 
the United States). Although President Theodore Roosevelt’s call for federal regulation was reiterated 
by two later presidents, Congress did not enact any federal legislation until the Great Depression. 
Thompson & Sale, supra, at 869. Moreover, the period between World War I and the Great Depres-
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market crash, Congress adduced that one of the crash’s primary causes was 
abusive market conduct.29 Consequently, in reforming the market, one of Con-
gress’s principal goals was to protect lay investors who were susceptible to 
such abuse.30 Its second priority was to ensure the integrity of the securities 
exchanges.31 As part of the New Deal legislation, Congress enacted the princi-
                                                                                                                           
sion experienced prolific economic participation and many individual investors entered the market for 
the first time. Allison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A 
Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 316 (1974). A larger population of investors and a resulting 
higher demand for securities led to elevated stock prices. Id. Approximately fifty billion dollars in 
new securities were offered during this period; half became worthless due to the 1929 stock market 
crash. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933); see also What We Do, supra (summarizing the historical 
events that led to the establishment of federal securities regulation). The 1929 stock market crash 
initiated the Great Depression, a period of deep economic recession in the United States that lasted 
late into the 1930s. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation of Executive 
Compensation, 57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 594 (2012) (describing the Great Depression and noting that 
unemployment in this period peaked at 24.9% in 1933). Prior to the Great Depression, securities were 
regulated at the state level by so-called “blue sky” laws. See Eric C. Chaffee, Securities Regulation in 
Virtual Space, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387, 1401–02 (2017) (noting that Kansas passed the first 
securities law in 1911, with many other jurisdictions following suit over the subsequent two decades); 
Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 22, at 331 (quoting MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION 
AND THE NEW DEAL 5 n.1 (1970)) (explaining that the “blue sky” laws were so named because law-
makers posited that, without intervention, “financial pirates would sell citizens everything in [the] 
state but the blue sky”). The securities industry’s principal participants had persuaded state legisla-
tures to adopt schemes of self-regulation. See Anderson, supra, at 318 (noting that the self-regulation 
scheme perpetuated by state statutes constituted an ineffective means of securities regulation). Unsur-
prisingly, the resulting hodgepodge of state statutes was too varied to be effective. See Chaffee, supra, 
at 1402 (asserting that various state securities statutes ultimately contributed to the stock market crash 
and the ensuing depression). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the 
Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1991) (describing the history of state blue sky laws). 
 29 See Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 339 (explaining how abusive practices, such as malicious 
price manipulation, contributed to the crash). During the depression that followed the crash, investors’ 
funds were wiped out and the public’s confidence in the securities exchanges declined. What We Do, 
supra note 28. Post-crash Senate hearings evidenced the fraudulent conduct that operated on the secu-
rities exchanges during the 1920s and early 1930s, such as price manipulation and self-dealing. An-
derson, supra note 28, at 316–17 (citing Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 
56 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 72d and 73d Congs. (1932–1934)). For example, 
wrongful manipulation occurred when professionals working within the New York Stock Exchange 
orchestrated fluctuations in stock prices either to encourage the public to buy—and thereby allow the 
professionals to unload their holdings—by creating high prices, or to induce it to sell by depressing 
the prices. Steven Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 385, 399 (1990). The lack of regulation allowed these abusive practices to perpetuate 
and ultimately exploited the unsuspecting public, comprised of unsophisticated individual investors in 
the exchanges. Anderson, supra note 28, at 317. 
 30 Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 339; see Chadbourne & Parke, 571 U.S. at 390 (stating that 
federal securities law aims to protect the exchanges from abusive behavior and thus protect investors); 
Anderson, supra note 28, at 316 (describing an investing public that, prior to the 1929 stock market 
crash, was not well situated to protect itself against abusive market conduct). 
 31 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (identifying the purpose of the act as regulating the ex-
changes and OTC markets). Requiring issuers to provide accurate disclosure of certain required in-
formation ensures the integrity of the markets. Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 909. Moreover, 
some contend that the primary benefit of the disclosure regime is to provide more accurate assess-
1542 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1535 
pal vehicles of federal securities legislation: the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act.32 Operating in tandem, the Acts created a system of federal securi-
ties regulation premised upon mandatory disclosure.33 
                                                                                                                           
ments of a security’s worth. Anderson, supra note 28, at 320. Stated differently, the market benefits 
from having prices better reflect the worth of the underlying securities. See id. at 320–21 (noting that 
modern scholars argue that investor protection was a secondary result of the mandatory disclosure 
regime). 
 32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Securities Act of 1933; Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727–
28; Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 869. Together, the dual aims of the Acts are to regulate the 
exchanges and to protect investors. See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and 
the Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 968 (2018) 
(pointing to investor protection and capital formation as the “twin goals” of federal securities regula-
tion). The mandatory disclosure regime seeks to further these purposes by ensuring investors are posi-
tioned to make fully informed investment decisions. Id. at 968–69. Lawmakers, however, had con-
templated various schemes by which to achieve securities reform. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 
28, at 869 (discussing the various schemes contemplated for federal securities legislation). Where 
others advocated for a system built upon direct government supervision, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt contemplated a system premised upon disclosure. Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 339. Inva-
sive methods of government regulation were considered. See id. (noting that legislative response to the 
Great Depression included calls for a federal corporations law). The disclosure regime, however, 
ultimately carried the day. See Turk & Woody, supra, at 969 (describing the regulatory framework 
created by the Acts as one based upon a system of mandatory disclosure). 
 33 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 320–21 (describing the effect of the Acts and noting that they 
both employ mandatory disclosure as the means to prevent abusive behavior). Under the system creat-
ed by the Acts, public companies are required to disclose certain important information to investors 
via various documents filed with the SEC. What We Do, supra note 28. The most typical forms of 
disclosure documents are Annual Reports on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, and Cur-
rent Reports on Form 8-K. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. Mandatory disclosure is thought 
to create efficiency in the markets by decreasing information asymmetry between issuers and inves-
tors, and in so doing, avoiding costly, more intrusive forms of regulation. Turk & Woody, supra note 
32, at 969 n.49. Making information available to the market ensures capital goes to its highest and 
best use. See Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail Flight, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 36, 45–46 (2014) (“If prices reflect informed judgments by market investors, stock prices are 
tools to help ensure that the companies that are the most profitable or efficient at providing desired 
goods and services receive the greatest share of investment capital.”). The book The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property, authored by Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, greatly influenced the 
drafters of the federal securities laws. Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 969 n.52. The work contended 
that management must answer to shareholders through the mandatory disclosure regime. Id. Louis 
Brandeis offered a frequently-quoted justification for mandatory disclosure when he remarked, 
“‘[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.’” Id. 
(quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)). 
Stated differently, compelling issuers to provide truthful information to the public can deter abusive 
conduct. See Cary Martin Shelby, Closing the Hedge Fund Loophole: The SEC as the Primary Regu-
lator of Systemic Risk, 58 B.C. L. REV. 639, 653 (2017) (“In other words, broadcasting information to 
large audiences can serve to uncover malfeasance and bad behavior.”). Mandatory disclosure ensures 
that investors are well-situated to make informed investing decisions and thus are less susceptible to 
abusive market practices. Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the 
Symposium on “The Past, Present, and Future of the SEC” (Oct. 16, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2009/spch101609tap.htm [https://perma.cc/FFR6-GYJ7]. 
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1. The Securities Act of 1933 
The Securities Act governs the initial public offering of new securities to 
the market, examining these issuances through a transactional lens.34 To cor-
rect the information-asymmetry inherent in the initial public offering, the law 
requires detailed disclosures to accompany the offering.35 Under the Securities 
Act, in the absence of an applicable exemption, no security can be offered for 
sale in interstate commerce without the issuer first filing a registration state-
ment with the SEC.36 Although the specific disclosure obligations vary among 
industries, a registration statement typically must thoroughly describe the issu-
er’s business, management, and nature of the securities offered and must pro-
vide copious financial information.37 
Notably, the Securities Act does not bestow authority on the SEC to eval-
uate the securities being registered.38 Although the Securities Act imposes a 
twenty-day waiting period between a registration statement’s date of filing and 
its date of effectiveness, the registration statement automatically becomes ef-
fective so long as its contents are not misleading or inadequate.39 The issuer 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 869; Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 969 (citing 15 
U.S.C. § 77a); see Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registra-
tion: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (1984) (describing the transactional disclosure 
requirements implemented by the Securities Act, which obligate an issuer to file a registration state-
ment with the SEC prior to selling its securities). Some consider the initial public offering (IPO) to be 
the most important instance of information asymmetry sought to be remedied by the federal securities 
laws because in the IPO an issuer sells securities to outside parties who presumably know next to 
nothing about the issuer. Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 869. Without mandatory disclosure, the 
investors are left in the dark with respect to the issuer’s business operations and financial outlook, 
among other things. See id. 
 35 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 323 (describing some of the detailed information required to 
be divulged in the registration statement for an IPO); Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 869–70 
(noting that IPOs involve a company offering securities for sale to individuals who are largely unin-
formed about the issuer’s operations and financial situation and who have no way to get such infor-
mation). 
 36 Anderson, supra note 28, at 321; Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 339. Prior to the enactment of 
the Exchange Act, the statute that created the SEC, the Federal Trade Commission administered the 
Securities Act. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 14 (8th ed. 2017). Exemptions from 
the registration statement requirement include transactions involving certain forms of securities or 
securities in specific types of transactions. Anderson, supra note 28, at 321 n.49 (citing the Securities 
Act of 1933 §§ 3, 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d). For example, Section 3 of the Securities Act exempts 
securities issued by banks, insurance companies, and government entities. Securities Act of 1933 § 3, 
15 U.S.C. § 77c. 
 37 COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 6. 
 38 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 322 (noting the Securities Act did not empower the SEC to 
assess the quality of securities an issuer offered for sale). Furthermore, the Securities Act criminalized 
the act of representing that the SEC made any assessment as to a security’s value or worth. Id. at 322 
n.50 (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w). Thus, the SEC had little oversight as to the 
content of an issuer’s registration statement. See id. at 322 (describing the lack of substantive authori-
ty the SEC possessed under the Securities Act). 
 39 See id. (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h). If the SEC determines that an issu-
er has misstated or omitted in a registration statement any material fact that would be required to make 
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can subsequently offer its securities for sale, but must provide to all purchasers 
a prospectus that includes the registration statement’s information.40 
In addition to registration provisions, the Securities Act also contains lia-
bility provisions.41 Section 11 of the Securities Act makes unlawful any mis-
statement or omission of material fact in the registration statement.42 Similarly, 
Section 12(a)(2) prohibits any misstatement or omission of material fact in 
communications relating to the distribution of securities in interstate com-
merce.43 Notably, these provisions create a dual-enforcement structure allow-
ing for both public enforcement by the SEC as well as private lawsuits brought 
by individual investors.44 
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
In contrast to the Securities Act’s focus on the initial public offering of 
securities, the Exchange Act focuses on disclosures that occur after an issuer’s 
introduction of securities to the market.45 The Exchange Act requires issuers of 
                                                                                                                           
the registration statement not misleading, the SEC is empowered to issue a stop order. Jones v. SEC, 
298 U.S. 1, 15 (1936). The stop order defers the effectiveness of the registration statement until that 
registration statement is amended to comply with the requirements of the stop order. Securities Act of 
1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d); Jones, 298 U.S. at 15. 
 40 Anderson, supra note 28, at 322. Section 10 of the Securities Act specifies in relevant part that 
a prospectus must include the information put forth in the registration statement. Securities Act of 
1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j. Aside from explicit exceptions listed in Section 3 of the Securities Act, 
this requirement is unconditional. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995); see supra note 
36 and accompanying text (discussing exemptions). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court 
has provided that a “prospectus” includes those documents that speak to public offerings by the regis-
trant or its majority stockholders. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569. The registration statement and the pro-
spectus must outline the issuer’s operations, the type of securities held out for sale, and disclose the 
firm handling the offering (and its financial stake in the offering). Anderson, supra note 28, at 323. 
Although the statute articulated certain information the registration statement and prospectus must 
include, it empowered the SEC with authority to revise the requirements. Id. at 322 (citing Securities 
Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, sched. A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa). 
 41 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2); see Turk & Woody, 
supra note 32, at 969–70 (noting that the Securities Act is bifurcated into registration and liability 
provisions). 
 42 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). For a description of the materiality standard, 
see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 43 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 
 44 See Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 970 (discussing how the provisions of the Securities Act 
make available as remedies both privately-initiated lawsuits and SEC enforcement actions); see also 
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)) (highlighting the importance of private actions as the “most effec-
tive weapon” in enforcing the federal securities laws). The Supreme Court has described private in-
vestor lawsuits as a required parallel to the SEC’s enforcement authority. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432. The 
SEC’s enforcement powers include issuing administrative cease-and-desist orders governed by Sec-
tion 8A of the Securities Act, and civil prosecutions in federal court governed by Section 20 of the 
Securities Act. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 7. 
 45 Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 970 (contrasting the Securities Act’s focus on disclosures 
during the IPO with the Exchange Act’s focus on disclosures after the IPO). The Great Depression’s 
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outstanding securities to register them and file periodic reports with the SEC.46 
The purpose of periodic reporting is to update the information that was offered 
in the issuer’s registration statement.47 Issuers are required to file their periodic 
reports only with the SEC, and are not required to send them directly to inves-
tors.48 Nonetheless, advocates of the Exchange Act believed that individual 
investors would—and still do—benefit under this scheme.49 In its original 
                                                                                                                           
serious consequences for the market did not result solely from new security offerings; then-outstanding 
securities greatly declined in value. See COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 7 (describing the decline in 
value experienced by securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange from eighty-nine billion dol-
lars prior to the 1929 stock market crash to fifteen billion dollars thereafter). There is, however, an 
important distinction between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Id. at 9. The Securities Act 
delegates to the Federal Trade Commission the specific critical task of registering IPOs subject to the 
Securities Act’s provisions; the goal, and how it is to be achieved, are clearly defined in the Securities 
Act. Id. In contrast, some view the Exchange Act as “a laundry list of problems” that Congress created 
the SEC to address. Id. 
 46 Anderson, supra note 28, at 327. Under current law, the three classes of companies that are 
subject to the Exchange Act’s requirements are companies having: (1) a class of securities registered 
on a national securities exchange; (2) assets exceeding ten million dollars and having “a class of equi-
ty securities held by at least 2000 record holders”; and (3) filed a registration statement under the 
Securities Act “that has become effective.” COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 10. If a company meets any 
of the three criteria, it is referred to as a “reporting company” due to its regular reporting obligations 
under the Exchange Act, and must register with the SEC. Id. 
 47 Anderson, supra note 28, at 327. Three of the most significant mandatory periodic filings are 
the Annual Report on Form 10-K, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, and the Current Report on 
Form 8-K. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 11; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (identifying the 
three most common mandatory periodic reports). The Form 10-K offers a “comprehensive overview 
of the company’s business and financial condition and includes audited financial statements.” Fast 
Answers: Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answers-form10khtm.html [https://perma.cc/H33N-FFJD]. The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, “filed 
for each of the first three fiscal quarters” of an issuer’s financial year, offers a “continuing view” of 
the company’s status throughout the fiscal year and includes unaudited financial information. Fast 
Answers: Form 10-Q, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answersform10qhtm.html [https://perma.cc/VDA4-LRYS]. Reporting companies must file a Current 
Report on Form 8-K to disclose the occurrence of certain material events that fall outside the reporting 
timeline of Forms 10-K and 10-Q. Fast Answers: Form 8-K, supra note 1. Moreover, the Exchange 
Act requires reporting companies to adhere to disclosure requirements regarding shareholder proxy 
solicitation. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 11. 
 48 COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 10 (noting that the Exchange Act contains no requirement that 
filings be submitted to investors or other market participants). Reporting companies are only required 
to file the required reports with the SEC. Anderson, supra note 28, at 328; see Mastronardi, supra note 
10, at 340 (explaining that reporting companies are not required to submit filings directly to inves-
tors). 
 49 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 328 (noting that, in the absence of a requirement that periodic 
reports be sent directly to investors, investors still ultimately receive the information contained in the 
reports because their investment advisors are financially incentivized to keep their clients informed). 
Furthermore, investors are thought to benefit from the mere availability of accurate information, re-
gardless of whether individual investors actually review such information. Id. As most filings submit-
ted to the SEC are publicly available through an SEC database, investors can access the filings, even if 
they are not sent directly to investors. See About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about [https://perma.cc/89UE-LTJU] (noting that the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system indexes submissions of required filings by issu-
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form, however, the Exchange Act applied only to the largest of companies—
those entities listed on a national exchange.50 
The Exchange Act also created the SEC, and vested it with vast authority to 
oversee the securities industry.51 To facilitate the exercise of oversight, the Ex-
change Act authorized the SEC to promulgate regulations.52 The SEC, organized 
into divisions and offices, carries out its mission through four primary divisions: 
Corporation Finance, Trading and Markets, Investment Management, and En-
forcement.53 
Like the Securities Act, the Exchange Act also contains liability provi-
sions.54 Section 10(b) contains the broad anti-fraud provision of the federal 
                                                                                                                           
ers to the SEC, but cautioning that not all filings submitted by public companies are available on ED-
GAR). 
 50 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 343 (noting that the original version of the Exchange Act ap-
plied only to securities listed on an exchange, but not those publicly offered in OTC markets); 
Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 870–71 (explaining that the Exchange Act originally only applied 
to the most expansive companies). Consequently, the original version of the Securities Act did not 
capture all publicly-traded companies. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 870–71 (highlighting 
that the Securities Act encompassed all publicly held companies only after the enactment of the 1964 
Amendments). 
 51 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d; Fast Answers: The Laws That Govern 
the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-
lawsshtml.html#secexact1934 [https://perma.cc/RHF9-23B4]. The SEC is an independent agency 
comprised of five commissioners. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 14. The commissioners are appointed 
by the President of the United States to serve five-year terms, staggered such that one term expires 
every June and that no more than three commissioners are of the same political party as the president. 
Id. 
 52 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (outlawing the use or em-
ployment, in connection with any security transaction, of “any manipulative or deceptive” device 
contrary to the rules and regulations the SEC puts forth as being in the public interest or achieving 
investor protection); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (empowering the SEC 
to promulgate rules and regulations “necessary or appropriate” to protect investors and ensure fairness 
in the markets); see also Anderson, supra note 28, at 327 (noting that the Exchange Act vested the 
SEC with the authority to issue regulations relating to shareholder proxy solicitation). 
 53 COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 15. The SEC’s mission is to protect the investing community, 
ensure fairness and efficiency throughout the securities markets, and enable capital formation. What 
We Do, supra note 28. The Division of Corporation Finance is responsible for carrying out the federal 
securities laws’ disclosure regime by reviewing the numerous reports filed with the SEC by regulated 
entities. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 15. The Division of Trading and Markets is responsible for 
overseeing secondary trading markets. Id. The Division of Investment Management carries out the 
Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (regu-
lating the conduct of investment entities, such as mutual funds, and mandating disclosure to the public 
of investment-related information); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (regulating the conduct of investment 
advisers, requiring registration with the SEC and adherence to investor protection regulations). Lastly, 
the Division of Enforcement—the most publicly visible of the divisions—investigates and brings 
action against entities for violations of the federal securities laws. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 15; 
Division of Enforcement: About the Division, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.
gov/page/enforcement-section-landing [https://perma.cc/79HV-4XNU]. See generally What We Do, 
supra note 28. 
 54 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 
970–71 (describing Section 10(b), the anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act). 
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securities laws.55 Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, makes unlawful, in 
connection with a security transaction, any misstatement or omission of mate-
rial fact required “to make the statements . . . not misleading” under the cir-
cumstances.56 Similar to Sections 11 and 12(a) of the Securities Act, Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are enforceable through both private causes of action and 
public enforcement action.57 SEC-regulated entities can consequently be held 
liable for deficient disclosure both by private parties and the SEC.58 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 970–71. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes unlawful 
the use or employment of any manipulative or deceptive device, in connection with a security transac-
tion, in violation of any SEC rule or regulation. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b). This language in Section 10(b) empowered the SEC to promulgate Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5; see Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 345 (noting that Section 10(b) vested authority in the 
SEC to outlaw various forms of deceptive conduct by enacting its own rules and regulations). 
 56 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942. COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 
695. Rule 10b-5 governs all forms of fraud relating to the transaction of securities. Id. at 695–96. 
Consequently, its reach is substantial. See Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 971–72 (describing Rule 
10b-5 as the “biggest stick” in federal securities regulation). 
 57 See COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 696 (explaining that Rule 10b-5 is enforceable both by the 
SEC and through an “implied private right of action”); Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 970 (noting 
that the liability provisions of the Securities Act can be enforced both by private lawsuits as well as 
SEC enforcement actions). There are, however, some differences between liability under the Securi-
ties Act and liability under the Exchange Act. See Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 971–72 (identify-
ing and discussing several differences between the liability provisions of the Securities Act and the 
liability provisions of the Exchange Act). For example, Section 10(b)’s verbiage does not allow for a 
private right of action by investors, although courts have long read an implied right of action into its 
language; Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act differ in this respect. See id. at 971 (citing Blue 
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723) (noting that the express language of Sections 11 and 12 of the Securi-
ties Act provide for private lawsuits by investors). To establish a violation of Section 10(b), a plaintiff 
must demonstrate: (1) a material misstatement or omission; (2) made with scienter; (3) in connection 
with the transaction of a security; (4) upon which the plaintiff relied; (5) to plaintiff’s economic loss; 
and (6) which caused plaintiff’s economic loss. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 
(2005). Moreover, the United States Department of Justice can bring criminal sanctions in response to 
violations of Section 10(b). Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 971–72; see Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 
at 737 (describing Rule 10b-5 as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn”). 
 58 Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 971–72; see Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current Land-
scape, AM. B. ASS’N (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/
blt/2014/10/03_kasner/ [https://perma.cc/YS79-QT2L] (noting that Section 10(b) lawsuits initiated by 
investors are a thorn in the side of publicly-traded entities). A typical lawsuit brought by a private 
investor involves an allegation of a misstatement or omission of material fact in a periodic report such 
as a Form 10-K or 10-Q. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 898–99 (stating that most of the 
securities fraud cases the authors studied raised allegations of material misstatement or omissions 
happening in the ordinary course of business). 
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3. Further Developments in Mandatory Disclosure 
a. 1964: SEC Requirements Extended to Over-the-Counter Markets 
The SEC has continued to emphasize disclosure.59 In 1964, the Exchange 
Act was expanded to apply to over-the-counter markets, where securities not 
listed on an exchange are traded.60 The newly enacted Section 12(g) of the Ex-
change Act effectuated this extension in coverage by requiring any class of 
securities to register with the SEC if it was held by at least 750 shareholders 
and issued by an entity having assets exceeding one million dollars.61 Prior to 
this expansion, companies could avoid the SEC’s jurisdiction by delisting their 
securities from the exchanges.62 With the 1964 Amendments, however, the 
SEC could enforce more stringent requirements against a broader array of 
companies.63 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 341–42 (describing further developments in the SEC’s man-
datory disclosure regime throughout the second half of the twentieth century). 
 60 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78lll) (stating that the purpose of the amendments was to extend the 
Acts’ mandatory disclosure obligations to additional issuers). Before the 1964 Amendments, the Ex-
change Act governed only those entities with securities traded on a national exchange, and securities 
traded OTC were therefore not covered. Lee J. Sclar, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: Se-
lected Provisions and Legislative Deficiencies, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1494, 1496 (1965). A vast trading 
volume occurred in the OTC markets. See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: 
Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 219 (2007) (noting that the 
OTC market generated $38.9 billion in sales in 1961). Given the significant trading volume and min-
imal information publicly available, the OTC market was ripe for exploitation. See id. at 219–20 (cit-
ing a widely-regarded 1963 SEC study that revealed that over ninety percent of fraud cases the SEC 
reported between January 1961 and July 1962 featured entities whose securities were traded on OTC 
markets, and which were therefore not bound by the federal securities laws’ disclosure obligations). At 
the request of Congress, the SEC carried out a vast examination of the securities markets, particularly the 
OTC market. Sclar, supra, at 1496. The report noted that a majority of companies trading on the OTC 
market either did not make disclosures to investors or provided disclosure that was in some way defi-
cient. Ferrell, supra, at 220. Therefore, among other recommendations, the report advocated for the ap-
plication of the Exchange Act’s periodic reporting obligations to OTC markets. Id. See generally Com-
pany Directory, OTC MARKETS, https://www.otcmarkets.com/corporate-services/company-directory 
[https://perma.cc/N7P8-T978] (listing companies traded in an OTC market). 
 61 Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, § 3(c); Sclar, supra note 60, at 1497. On July 1, 1966, 
these registration requirements were also extended to apply to any class with at least five hundred 
shareholders. Sclar, supra note 60, at 1497. Altogether, the 1964 Securities Amendment extended 
disclosure obligations to all public companies. Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 871 & n.47. The 
SEC subsequently increased the assets minimum to ten million dollars. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 
(instructing that an issuer need not register with the SEC if its total assets are not more than ten mil-
lion dollars). 
 62 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 343 (noting that, prior to the 1964 Securities Amendments, 
many companies would simply delist their securities rather than submit to the SEC’s “stringent disclo-
sure standards”). 
 63 See Sclar, supra note 60, at 1497 (providing that the 1964 Amendments enabled the application 
of the Exchange Act’s requirements to both listed and OTC securities). The SEC also shifted its em-
phasis towards mandatory disclosure as a means of enabling investment analysis by members of the 
investing public. See Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 341 (explaining that SEC regulation began to 
2020] SEC Zeroes In on Cybersecurity 1549 
b. 1982: Integration at Last 
Decades after the enactments of the Acts, opponents of the disclosure re-
gime criticized the redundancy of their requirements.64 Until the 1980s, the 
requirements of the Acts were enforced separately, and issuers, therefore, in-
curred duplicative reporting obligations.65 Consequently, in the 1970s, the SEC 
began to contemplate an integrated disclosure regime that would cut down on 
the repetitive requirements.66 
In 1982, the SEC enacted Regulation S-K, a scheme of integrated disclo-
sure.67 Upon its release, the SEC indicated that Regulation S-K’s objective was 
to lessen the burden on issuers by reducing duplicative disclosure require-
                                                                                                                           
emphasize the role of mandatory disclosure in assessing investment decisions). As part of this change 
in tone, the SEC dialed back some of its requirements that mandatory disclosures need to be framed 
negatively and related only to “hard facts.” Anderson, supra note 28, at 343; see Mastronardi, supra 
note 10, at 341 n.48 (explaining that “hard facts” are the opposite of “soft information,” which is in-
formation that cannot be assessed objectively). The securities markets became increasingly sophisti-
cated, resulting in an increased demand for advanced forms of modeling and analysis. Anderson, su-
pra note 28, at 343. Despite this increasing sophistication, concerns for investor protection remained. 
See id. (noting that the SEC acknowledged that disclosure is still an effective form of investor protec-
tion). In so doing, the SEC recognized the informal value of disclosure and the fact that directly regu-
lating conduct is the most effective way to prevent fraudulent and abusive behaviors. See id. at 343 & 
n.158 (noting that the SEC began to directly regulate abusive selling practices). 
 64 See Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1341–42 (1966) 
(arguing that the disclosure obligations created by the Acts are duplicative, and that an integrated 
statutory scheme is more efficient). “Truth in Securities” Revisited was highly influential, and the 
SEC echoed its call for an integrated disclosure system in its 1969 Disclosure Policy Study, also 
known as the Wheat Report. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K, at 9 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/files/reg-sk-disclosure-
requirements-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4U-VXX7] (discussing the Wheat Report, which called 
for the expansion of Form S-7—the SEC’s “first streamlined registration form”—and greater consoli-
dation of the Acts’ requirements). 
 65 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 64, at 10 (noting that Regulation S-K represented 
the introduction of uniform requirements for registration statements and periodic reports). Not only 
was redundant information required, but the form in which it was to be presented varied between the 
Acts’ two sets of requirements. John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Com-
ing Debate Over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1158 (1995). Similarly, alt-
hough the Acts used some of the same terms to carry out its requirements, the terms were not defined 
consistently. Id. 
 66 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 64 (describing a report issued by the SEC in 1977 that 
called for a unified mandatory disclosure regime); see Coffee, supra note 65, at 1145 (asserting that 
under the Exchange Act’s scheme of continuous disclosure, logic would dictate that an issuer only be 
required to disclose material information not previously shared). 
 67 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.1208 (encompassing the entirety of Regulation S-K); Thompson & 
Sale, supra note 28, at 873–74 (discussing the disclosure regime implemented by Regulation S-K). 
The SEC implemented the first version of Regulation S-K in 1977, although it was reshaped and ex-
tended in 1982. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 64, at 10. Similarly, the SEC implemented 
Regulation S-X, providing requirements for accounting standards, as part of the regime of integrated 
disclosure. Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 972 n.69; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01–.12.29 (encompass-
ing the entirety of Regulation S-X). 
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ments.68 To effectuate this goal, Regulation S-K established numerous substan-
tive requirements covering the non-financial items that an issuer must disclose in 
corporate filings with the SEC.69 Regulation S-K eliminated redundancies by 
creating one unified set of disclosure obligations for the initial registration under 
the Securities Act and the further periodic reporting under the Exchange Act.70 
Under Regulation S-K, issuers are obligated to disclose to the SEC—and 
by extension to investors—a large volume of information covering numerous 
subjects, such as pending legal proceedings and corporate governance infor-
mation.71 Although Regulation S-K covers a broad array of subject matter, dis-
closure is limited to material information—information that a reasonable in-
vestor is substantially likely to consider important in determining whether to 
purchase or sell the registered security.72 Failure to adhere to these require-
ments by omitting or misstating any material information could result in liabil-
ity under federal securities law.73 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 11,380, 11,382 (Mar. 3, 1982) (stating that the goal of Regulation S-K was to alleviate regis-
trants’ burdens under the Acts by removing duplicative reporting obligations while also ensuring that 
investors receive “meaningful nonduplicative information” to make investment determinations). 
 69 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 64, at 8 (noting that Regulation S-K governs non-
financial statement disclosure obligations); Thompson & Sale, supra note 28, at 873–74 (noting that, 
with the passage of Regulation S-K, the SEC regulates both the timing and content of disclosures); 
Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 972 n.69 (“Reg[ulation] S-K demands a formidable amount of dis-
closure regarding corporate operations, governance structures, financial information, pending legal 
proceedings, corporate officers and board members, among numerous other topics.”). 
 70 Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC Is Riding Off in Two Directions at Once, 71 
BUS. LAW. 781, 785 (2016). 
 71 See Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 972 n.69 (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.1208; Amend-
ments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and Guides, SEC Release No. 33-
6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63630 (Sept. 25, 1980); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11380 (Mar. 3, 1982)) (highlighting the substantive requirements 
of Regulation S-K); Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 342 (stating that Regulation S-K includes numer-
ous obligations for substantive disclosure); supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (noting that 
reporting companies are not explicitly required to disclose information directly to investors). 
 72 Karmel, supra note 70, at 785–86 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.405). Registrants do not need to 
conduct an independent assessment of the materiality of any information that is required—a fixed line 
item—under Regulation S-K. Id. at 786. SEC Rule 12b-20, however, requires companies to disclose 
any further information that is needed to make the statements not misleading given the circumstances 
under which they are put forth. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20; see Karmel, supra note 70, at 786 (explaining 
that reporting companies oftentimes need to go further than the line-item requirements of Regulation 
S-K). 
 73 See Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 974 (noting that the SEC can police violations of Regula-
tion S-K); Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 342 (specifying that, although Regulation S-K compels dis-
closure of a wide range of information, it is limited to information that is material). To make out a 
claim of fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other 
elements, that the defendant made a misstatement or omission of material fact, and with scienter. 
Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 345 (emphasis added). 
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B. Why Disclosure?: Understanding the Rationale for  
Federal Securities Regulation 
Federal securities regulation is premised upon a mandatory disclosure re-
gime: the law creates a duty for issuers to disclose certain information at spe-
cific times.74 A principal justification for this system is that the mandatory dis-
closure regime makes markets more efficient by decreasing the asymmetry of 
information between issuers and investors.75 Mandatory disclosure equalizes 
investors’ access to information, and makes that information easier to digest.76 
Another common argument is that mandatory disclosure protects investors 
from abusive practices, such as exploitation.77 
Although mandatory disclosure remains foundational to the SEC’s regula-
tory efforts, its efficacy is still debated.78 One of the strongest arguments 
against mandatory disclosure centers on its role in dispersing information to 
investors.79 Critics of the disclosure regime argue that information already 
flows to investors without any regulations to compel disclosure.80 This coun-
terargument asserts that a company is independently motivated to disclose ma-
terial information to its investors, regardless of SEC requirements, because 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 968–69 (identifying the mandatory disclosure scheme as 
the primary mechanism for carrying out the goals of the federal securities laws). The system, however, 
is structured such that issuers are obligated to disclose only when affirmative law creates such an 
obligation. See Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We do not have a sys-
tem of continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad 
news) unless positive law creates a duty to disclose.”). 
 75 Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 969 n.49 (citing Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199–200 
(1999)); Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 343 (noting that mandatory disclosure enables the proliferation 
of access to truthful information, thereby making markets more efficient). Moreover, at the same time, 
costlier and more stringent regulatory intervention is avoided. Turk & Woody, supra note 32, at 969 
n.49. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 692–96 (describing, and arguing against, 
some of the common justifications raised in support of the mandatory disclosure regime). Frank 
Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel ultimately find several of the common rationales to be unpersuasive, 
and put forward several alternative rationales in support of mandatory disclosure, including a cap on 
the costs generated by the common law regime and the prevention of interstate manipulation. Id. 
 76 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 694 (noting that disclosure requirements mandate 
simple presentation of and equal access to information, in theory enabling anyone to understand it and 
thus helping to prevent the manipulation of lay investors). 
 77 See Cohen, supra note 64, at 1367–68 (noting that the regime of mandatory disclosure purports 
to protect investors in all facets of securities trading); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 693–95 
(describing an argument that providing information to investors equips them to fend for themselves 
against abuse). 
 78 Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 343–45. Moreover, even advocates disagree over the optimal 
level of disclosure. See id. (describing the disagreement over the most effective level of disclosure 
needed to generate the most efficiency in the securities markets). 
 79 See id. at 344 (describing a common counterargument to mandatory disclosure: that it is not 
needed to stimulate information’s dissemination). 
 80 Id. 
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doing so will generate higher profits.81 Another criticism of disclosure obliga-
tions is that they are detrimental to the market because the volume of infor-
mation required by them overwhelms investors, rendering them unable to dis-
cern the information most important to their positions.82 Critics also challenge 
mandatory disclosure’s role in protecting investors from exploitation, claiming 
that unsophisticated investors, in fact, already enjoy the benefits of sophisticated 
investors’ digestion of information released to the market, in the form of prices 
that incorporate all information obtainable about the underlying securities.83 
C. Shifting Focus: The SEC Hones In on Cybersecurity 
1. 2011 Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance 
On May 11, 2011, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Sen-
ate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (“Commerce 
Committee”) urged the SEC to issue guidance pertaining to the disclosure of 
cybersecurity incidents.84 A cybersecurity “incident” is defined as an incident 
that does have or potentially can have a negative impact on an entity’s infor-
mation system, or the data contained in that system.85 The Commerce Commit-
tee’s request noted that many issuers do not disclose cybersecurity-related in-
cidents to their investors and cited a 2009 study that found that thirty-eight 
percent of Fortune 500 companies made a “significant oversight” in failing to 
address cybersecurity concerns in their filings with the SEC.86 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. 
 82 See id. (describing the concern that a large volume of disclosure obligations will be detrimental 
to the securities market). In mandating disclosure of vast amounts of information, too many disclosure 
obligations could inundate investors with such a volume of information that investors will not be able 
to determine the relevancy of individual pieces of information. Id. 
 83 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 694 (“The uninformed traders can take a free ride on 
the information impounded by the market: they get the same price received by the professional traders 
without having to do any of the work of learning information.”). 
 84 Letter from John D. Rockefeller IV et al., Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., to 
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (May 11, 2011), https://www.commerce.
senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4ceb6c11-b613-4e21-92c7-a8e1dd5a707e/41A8309A6FC78E9630
AEEA660D81D379.5.11.11-letter-to-sec.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KEE-9S3D] (requesting that the SEC 
develop guidance pertaining to cybersecurity disclosure, particularly on the materiality of system and 
network hacks). The letter emphasized that cybersecurity was one of the period’s most pressing issues. 
See id. (explaining that unauthorized parties attempt to misappropriate data to the detriment of busi-
nesses, individuals, and the economy as a whole). Due to the importance of the threat, the Committee 
requested clarification on the disclosure obligations for corporate issuers. Id. 
 85 Glossary, NAT’L INITIATIVE FOR CYBERSECURITY CAREERS & STUD., https://niccs.us-cert.
gov/about-niccs/glossary#I [https://perma.cc/7J2C-7D5B] (defining a cybersecurity “incident”). 
 86 Letter from John D. Rockefeller IV et al. to Mary Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1–2. The letter 
mentioned some filings that identified cybersecurity breaches, but stated that it noticed no filings that 
articulated steps to mitigate exposure to cybersecurity breaches. Id. at 2. Given the inconsistencies in 
reporting, the Committee asked that the SEC issue guidance clarifying disclosure requirements relat-
ing to cybersecurity concerns. Id. 
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Commerce Committee asserted, clarifying the obligations of SEC filers with 
respect to cybersecurity, that disclosure was paramount.87 Shortly thereafter, on 
October 13, 2011, the Division of Corporation Finance issued guidance articu-
lating its position on disclosure obligations regarding cybersecurity breaches.88 
Although it was issued by the SEC’s staff, the 2011 guidance did not have the 
force or effect of law.89 
The 2011 guidance first explained that the SEC’s mandatory disclosure re-
gime ensures timely disclosure of material cybersecurity information—that 
which a reasonable investor would view as significant in rendering a decision 
related to her investments.90 Although no disclosure requirement then in exist-
ence explicitly governed cybersecurity issues, the 2011 guidance asserted that 
several disclosure requirements may nonetheless compel issuers to disclose such 
issues.91 The 2011 guidance identified areas in which cybersecurity disclosure 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See id. (asserting that public company disclosure of material cybersecurity incidents is “incon-
sistent and unreliable” and requesting clarification from the SEC). 
 88 Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 12. The disclosure guidance was not, however, the first time the 
SEC acted with an eye towards cybersecurity. See Pierotti, supra note 3, at 410 (discussing the SEC’s 
“safeguards rule,” which it enacted in 2000). On November 13, 2000, the SEC enacted the “safe-
guards rule,” which created standards for financial institutions’ protection of consumer data. Id. The 
SEC updated the rule in 2005 to require institutions to develop and carry out “‘written policies and 
procedures’” covering the safeguards the institutions will take to protect consumer information. Id. 
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a)). The policies must be reasonably calculated to: (1) afford security and 
confidentiality for the data; (2) protect against potential cybersecurity threats; and (3) stop any unap-
proved “access to or use of the data that could cause substantial harm or inconvenience.” Id. In the 
decades following its promulgation of the safeguards rule, however, the SEC brought few actions 
under its auspices. Id. (noting that the SEC brought only three enforcement actions under the safe-
guards rule in the ten years after it came into effect). 
 89 See Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 12 (stating that the guidance reflects only the perspective of 
the SEC’s Division of Corporation and not that of the SEC at large). Moreover, the guidance explicit-
ly stated that the SEC took no position on its substance. See id. (asserting that the SEC has “neither 
approved nor disapproved” of the information put forth in the 2011 Division of Corporation Finance 
guidance). 
 90 See id. (noting that one of the purposes of the Acts is to ensure full and complete disclosure of 
material information about risks and events). Assessing the materiality of cybersecurity incidents 
requires consideration of factors such as the incident’s scale, the information subject to the breach, 
and the possible effect on the reporting company’s operations. Daniel F. Schubert, Jonathan G. Ce-
darbaum & Leah Schloss, The SEC’s Two Primary Theories in Cybersecurity Enforcement Actions, 
CYBERSECURITY L. REP., Apr. 8, 2015, at 1, 3, https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/publications/
the-secs-two-primary-theories-in-cybersecurity-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/5QEM-4QWJ]. 
 91 Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 12 (“Although no existing disclosure requirement explicitly 
refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, a number of disclosure requirements may impose 
an obligation on registrants to disclose such risks and incidents.”); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 
SEC ISSUES EXPANDED INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON CYBERSECURITY MATTERS 1–2 (Feb. 27, 
2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_SEC_Issues_Expanded_
Interpretive_Guidance_on_Cybersecurity_Matters.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQK6-DEJC] (noting that 
cybersecurity issues are implicated by the federal securities laws, despite the fact that the latter techni-
cally do not speak of the former). Issuers are required to disclose material information relating to 
cybersecurity incidents that are necessary to make other disclosed statements not misleading in light 
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would be warranted: those involving risk factors, management’s discussion and 
analysis of financial condition and results of operations (“MD&A”), description 
of business, legal proceedings, financial statement disclosure, and disclosure 
control and procedures.92 
Under Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, an SEC registrant must discuss in 
filings with the SEC the attributes rendering an investment in the company 
“speculative or risky.”93 In the risk factor section, the Commission stated that 
if cybersecurity risks are some of the most significant hazards that make an 
investment with an issuer “speculative or risky,” that issuer should disclose the 
risk of cybersecurity incidents.94 In so doing, the issuer should consider past 
cybersecurity breaches, their severity, and the likelihood of future breaches.95 
In the MD&A section, the Commission stated that an issuer should disclose 
cybersecurity risks to the extent they reflect a “material event, trend, or uncer-
tainty that is reasonably likely to have a material effect” on the registrant’s fi-
nancial outlook.96 In the description of business section, the SEC instructed 
issuers to note if a cybersecurity incident would have a material effect on as-
pects of an issuer’s business.97 In the legal proceeding section, the SEC ad-
vised that an issuer should disclose any material pending litigation in which 
the registrant or its subsidiaries is a party and which stems from a cybersecuri-
ty incident.98 In the financial statement disclosure section, the SEC instructed 
issuers to consider carefully when disclosure of a cybersecurity incident is re-
quired, given the potential effect such an incident could have on a corpora-
tion’s balance sheet.99 Lastly, in the disclosure controls and procedures section, 
the guidance instructed issuers to disclose information relating to the effective-
                                                                                                                           
of their circumstances. Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 12. Furthermore, generic language is inappropri-
ate: issuers must describe their cybersecurity issues in terms specifically applicable to the issuers. Id. 
 92 Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 12 (providing guidance for cybersecurity-related disclosures that 
are captured by other disclosure obligations mandated by the federal securities laws); see 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 229.10–.1208 (setting forth the entirety of Regulation S-K’s requirements). See generally Benja-
min A. Powell et al., SEC Issues New Guidance on Disclosing Cybersecurity Risks and Incidents, 
WILMERHALE (Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/publications/sec-issues-new-
guidance-on-disclosing-cybersecurity-risks-and-incidents-october-27-2011 [https://perma.cc/DKE6-
ZZB6] (summarizing the 2011 SEC Cybersecurity guidance). 
 93 17 C.F.R. § 229.503. 
 94 Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 12. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. (providing that an issuer should disclose to investors whether cybersecurity incidents, if 
experienced, have a material impact on the issuer’s business). 
 98 See id. (offering as an example of this requirement that the breach of voluminous consumer 
information, ultimately leading to “material litigation,” would trigger disclosure obligations, including 
where the lawsuit was brought, when the litigation commenced, the parties to the lawsuit, the under-
ling factual allegations, and the relief requested). 
 99 See id. (noting that companies must consider whether disclosure is necessary when a cyberse-
curity incident is uncovered after financial statements are prepared, but before they are released). 
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ness of such controls and procedures, particularly to the extent cybersecurity 
incidents impact the issuer’s ability to collect and report information to the 
SEC in mandatory periodic reports.100 
The 2011 guidance established that cybersecurity risks impact nearly eve-
ry aspect of an issuer’s business.101 Moreover, it confirmed that cybersecurity 
concerns affect not only companies, but also investors and the economy at 
large.102 Senator Rockefeller, the author of the Senate Committee’s letter to the 
SEC, responded positively to the guidance.103 He believed that the 2011 guid-
ance would profoundly alter the way companies address cybersecurity is-
sues.104 Indeed, following the issuance of the 2011 guidance, many corporate 
issuers started to include disclosures relating to cybersecurity incidents in their 
mandatory corporate filings.105 
2. 2014–2016: Uptick in SEC Cybersecurity Activity 
In 2014, the SEC affirmed the 2011 cybersecurity guidance at a roundtable 
on cybersecurity.106 Then-Chairwoman of the SEC Mary Jo White stated that 
the Commission’s jurisdiction over cybersecurity concerns extended to ensur-
ing market integrity, protection of consumer data, and disclosure of material 
information.107 White also affirmed the SEC’s ongoing commitment to further 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. By way of example, the Division of Corporation Finance noted that “if it is reasonably 
possible that information would not be recorded properly due to a cyber incident affecting a regis-
trant’s information systems, a registrant may conclude that its disclosure controls and procedures are 
ineffective.” Id. 
 101 See id. (describing the disclosure requirements of periodic reports implicated by cybersecurity 
incidents, despite the fact that the requirements themselves do not specifically address cybersecurity). 
 102 See Powell et al., supra note 92 (noting that the 2011 guidance emphasizes cybersecurity’s 
implications for the economy at large, not only for companies). 
 103 See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Rockefeller Says SEC 
Guidance Fundamentally Changes the Future of Cybersecurity (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.commerce.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/10/rockefeller-says-sec-guidance-fundamentally-changes-the-
future-of-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/ATU3-N5EX] (stating that Senator Rockefeller was 
“pleased” that the SEC acted on the Senate Committee’s request). 
 104 See id. (stating that the 2011 Division of Corporation Finance guidance “changes everything” 
because it will enable market assessment of public companies based on, among other criteria, compa-
nies’ cybersecurity prowess). 
 105 Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 8167 (noting that many companies addressed cybersecurity issues in their disclosures, mostly 
in the risk factors section, after the 2011 guidance); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 91, at 2 
(stating that after the 2011 release many issuers began to disclose cybersecurity breaches, generally in 
the forward-looking statement or risk factors sections). 
 106 See Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Cybersecurity Roundtable 9 (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
cybersecurity-roundtable/cybersecurity-roundtable-transcript.txt [https://perma.cc/6PU2-L97Z] (not-
ing that the 2011 SEC guidance on cybersecurity compels disclosure of cybersecurity incidents that 
have a material impact on an issuer’s operations and overall performance). 
 107 Id. 
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development of its standards relating to cybersecurity concerns.108 Following 
the roundtable, the SEC continued to focus on cybersecurity, issuing new guid-
ance on the subject and even, in some instances, authoring comment letters 
that directed companies to disclose specific cybersecurity incidents.109 For ex-
ample, in 2012 the SEC issued a Comment Letter to Amazon.com, Inc. (“Am-
azon”), directing Amazon to disclose details of a cybersecurity attack faced by 
one of its subsidiaries, Zappos.com.110 In response, Amazon provided revised 
disclosure about the Zappos.com incident.111 
During the same period, the SEC also addressed cybersecurity through 
means other than disclosure.112 In 2015, the SEC brought its first cybersecuri-
ty-related enforcement action against R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, 
Inc. under Regulation S-P.113 Promulgated by the SEC in 2000, Regulation S-P 
compels financial institutions to abide by policies that are “reasonably de-
signed” to protect the sensitive personal information of consumers, to secure 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See id. (stating that, following the Division of Corporation Finance’s 2011 guidance, the SEC 
continued to assess the importance of cybersecurity issues to SEC issuers, the securities markets, and 
investors, particularly with respect to cybersecurity-focused disclosure). 
 109 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE UPDATE 1–2 
(2015), https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2015-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BED-Z3GM] 
(addressing cybersecurity regulatory updates relevant to registered investment companies and advis-
ers); Megan Gordon et al., The Equifax Hack, SEC Data Breach, and Issuer Disclosure Obligations, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2017/10/05/the-equifax-hack-sec-data-breach-and-issuer-disclosure-obligations/#12 [https://perma.
cc/L9XC-M27U] (pointing to a 2012 SEC comment letter compelling Amazon.com, Inc. to disclose 
cybersecurity incidents affecting its subsidiaries). The SEC utilizes two kinds of comment letters. Fast 
Answers: Comment Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answerscommentlettershtm.html [https://perma.cc/8P5E-NC3J]. The first are those submitted to the 
SEC by people and companies in response to SEC requests for public comments as part of its rule-
making process. Id.; see supra note 16 (explaining these notice and comment rulemaking procedures). 
The second type of SEC comment letters include correspondence between the SEC and its regulated 
entities, made publicly available on EDGAR. Fast Answers: Comment Letters, supra. These comment 
letters can feature, for example, a request by the SEC for the regulated entity to disclose further in-
formation to help the SEC’s review of the entity’s corporate filings or an instruction to provide more 
disclosure in a future filing with the SEC. Id. These comment letters apply only to the specific filings 
in question. Id. Moreover, although the comment letters disclose the decisions of the SEC’s staff, they 
are not official statements of the SEC’s viewpoint. Id. 
 110 See Amazon.com, Inc., SEC Comment Letter (Mar. 12, 2012) (obligating Amazon to fix items 
of disclosure in its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011). 
 111 See Amazon.com, Inc., SEC Correspondence (May 3, 2012) (discussing future disclosure of 
cybersecurity incidents, particularly as a risk factor that Amazon faces); see also Amazon.com, Inc., 
SEC Correspondence (Apr. 9, 2012) (providing details about the Zappos.com cyber incident). 
 112 See Gordon et al., supra note 109 (describing SEC enforcement actions and annual inspections 
that addressed cybersecurity concerns). 
 113 Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (containing the SEC’s requirements for safeguarding the sensitive 
personal information of consumers). The SEC enforcement action concerned the July 2013 breach of a 
third-party server R.T. Jones utilized to store sensitive, personal information of over one hundred 
thousand clients, which was made vulnerable to misappropriation. Gordon et al., supra note 109. 
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this information against anticipated breaches, and to prevent unapproved use of 
the information that could cause the consumer significant harm.114 
Likewise, in 2016 the SEC brought action against Morgan Stanley, a reg-
istered investment adviser, for allegedly failing to safeguard appropriately the 
personal information of its consumers.115 At the same time, the SEC emphasized 
cybersecurity issues in the annual inspections of registered investment advisers 
conducted by its Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations.116 
3. 2017–2018: Creation of the Cyber Unit and Issuance of the 2018 
Cybersecurity Disclosures Guidance 
In September 2017, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton released a report outlin-
ing a broad strategy for overseeing the cybersecurity policies of SEC-regulated 
entities.117 The SEC report addressed five overarching points: (1) the type of 
information the SEC amasses and makes available to the public; (2) how the 
SEC balances and responds to its own cybersecurity risks; (3) how it considers 
cybersecurity in its supervision of regulated entities; (4) how it works with 
other regulators to diminish cybersecurity threats; and (5) how it wields its en-
forcement authority to protect investors and markets from abusive cybersecuri-
ty actors.118 In the same document, Clayton reported that not even the SEC is 
                                                                                                                           
 114 17 C.F.R. § 248.30; Gordon et al., supra note 109. 
 115 Gordon et al., supra note 109. A former employee of Morgan Stanley downloaded personal 
information relating to over seven hundred thousand accounts to his personal server. Press Release, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC: Morgan Stanley Failed to Safeguard Customer Data (June 8, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-112.html [https://perma.cc/UGA4-6NPH]. The 
former employee’s personal server was ultimately hacked. Id. Following the hack, some of the stolen 
customer information was placed on the internet, accompanied by an offer to procure more stolen data 
for interested buyers. Pierotti, supra note 3, at 413. Although Morgan Stanley utilized written policies 
and procedures, it nonetheless violated the safeguards rules because those policies and procedures 
were not reasonably designed to protect the underlying consumer information. See id. at 413–14 (not-
ing that Morgan Stanley’s policies neither properly limited employee access nor logged how employ-
ees were utilizing the consumer information or when they accessed Morgan Stanley’s systems). 
 116 Gordon et al., supra note 109. The SEC began to zero in on cybersecurity issues during exam-
inations in January 2014, when it requested that the firms it examined provide information relating to 
cybersecurity incidents, including, for example, any known cybersecurity risks, the firm’s cybersecu-
rity protections, any identified unauthorized access to the firm’s network, and whether and how a firm 
reacted to a cybersecurity incident. Id. The following year, during the 2015 examination cycle, the 
SEC built on the 2014 approach, but it also assessed the procedures and controls utilized by firms to 
assess preparedness for cybersecurity incidents. Id. 
 117 Clayton, supra note 11 (detailing the SEC’s approach to five aspects of cybersecurity regula-
tion). 
 118 See id. (stating that the report would address cybersecurity risks and events faced by both 
SEC-regulated entities and the SEC itself). Like previous SEC statements, Chairman Clayton’s cyber-
security statement reinforced the SEC’s commitment to adequate disclosure by public companies of 
cybersecurity-related issues. See id. (stating that the SEC continues to assess the viability of the 2011 
Division of Corporation Finance guidance while considering evolving cybersecurity concerns facing 
both issuers and the securities markets). 
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immune from cybersecurity incidents, acknowledging a 2016 breach of an 
SEC database.119 Several days after the report, the Commission announced the 
creation of a new Cyber Unit within the Division of Enforcement.120 This new 
unit was established to address cybersecurity-related misconduct, and was creat-
ed in response to the Division of Enforcement’s belief that cybersecurity con-
cerns are one of the greatest modern threats to markets and their participants.121 
Following the creation of the Cyber Unit, the SEC continued its focus on 
cybersecurity-related disclosure.122 In February 2018, the SEC released new 
interpretive guidance pertaining to disclosures of cybersecurity risks and inci-
dents.123 This 2018 guidance affirmed the positions articulated by the SEC’s 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See id. (addressing the cybersecurity breach the SEC experienced in 2016); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Brings Charges in EDGAR Hacking Case (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-1 [https://perma.cc/V8MH-4UZW] (describing a breach 
of an SEC database, thereby giving the hackers access to sensitive—and nonpublic—information). In 
2016, unauthorized users gained access to EDGAR, the electronic storehouse for public filings sub-
mitted to the SEC. Press Release, supra. In its breach of EDGAR, the hackers gained access to confi-
dential “test filings,” which SEC registrants can submit to the SEC in advance of an actual filing to 
ensure EDGAR will correctly process the filings. Id. In gaining access to nonpublic financial infor-
mation, the hackers earned over four million dollars in unlawful profits. Id. Although the SEC learned 
of the breach in 2016, it did not ascertain that the hackers could have utilized the information to make 
illicit trades until the following year. Renae Merle, SEC Reveals It Was Hacked, Information May 
Have Been Used for Illegal Stock Trades, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), http://wapo.st/2yt1mtEtid
=ss_mail&utm_term=.82b4f3ce9952 [https://perma.cc/Y9Q5-QPFR]. Moreover, this incident was not 
the first breach of EDGAR. Id. (describing cybersecurity incidents in 2014 and 2015). 
 120 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Com-
bat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/LLF3-4BA8]. On the same day, the SEC also announced the 
creation of a retail strategy task force, whose mission is to prevent abusive practices that target retail 
investors. Id. 
 121 See id. (emphasizing the significant risk that cybersecurity poses to investors and the markets, 
and noting that the Cyber Unit will enhance the SEC’s ability and expertise in the field). The Cyber 
Unit had a busy year in 2018, bringing twenty separate cybersecurity-related actions. See U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-
annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD8C-STVB] (summarizing the Cyber Unit’s efforts in 
fiscal year 2018). 
 122 See Craig Newman, SEC Cyber Briefing: Regulatory Expectations for 2019, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/02/sec-
cyber-briefing-regulatory-expectations-for-2019/ [https://perma.cc/PBJ3-YDWC] (noting that the 
SEC released updated guidance for the disclosure of cybersecurity risks in February 2018). 
 123 Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 8166. The 2018 guidance was more authoritative than the 2011 guidance because it was au-
thored by the SEC, whereas the Division of Corporation Finance prepared the 2011 guidance. EY 
CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, SEC GUIDANCE ON CYBERSECURITY: BOARD CON-
SIDERATIONS 1 (2018), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cybersecurity/
ey-sec-guidance-on-cybersecurity-board-considerations.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVZ5-VFEQ]. Moreo-
ver, the 2011 guidance did not reflect the official position of the SEC. See Div. of Corp. Fin., supra 
note 12 (stating that the guidance contained only the opinions of the Division of Corporation Finance 
and not that of the SEC). 
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Division of Corporation Finance in its 2011 guidance.124 The 2018 guidance, 
however, added two new topics of interest: the significance of policies pertain-
ing to cybersecurity, and prohibitions against insider trading in the context of 
cybersecurity.125 The 2018 guidance cited these new areas of discussion as part 
of the underlying purpose of its issuance, in addition to reemphasizing the in-
creasing relevance of its focus on cybersecurity.126 
The SEC also reinforced the need for issuers to disclose cybersecurity 
risks that have a material significance to investors.127 In assessing the material-
ity of cybersecurity incidents, the SEC stated that companies commonly bal-
ance factors such as the “nature, extent, and potential magnitude” of an identi-
fied cybersecurity incident—especially in light of the potential impact on cor-
porate operations—as well as the kind of harm that could result from the inci-
dent.128 Nevertheless, the SEC carefully noted that companies are not required 
to disclose sensitive information that could compromise their cybersecurity 
protection efforts.129 The SEC, however, added a new, specific disclosure re-
quirement that describes the role of the company’s board of directors in over-
seeing and managing cybersecurity risk.130 
In addition to disclosure requirements, the 2018 guidance emphasized the 
need for companies to have policies and procedures in place to determine the 
effect of any cybersecurity incidents on a company’s operations and to assess 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8167 (noting that the 2018 guidance builds upon the Division of Corporation Finance’s 
2011 guidance). Reaffirming the 2011 guidance, the 2018 guidance stated that a company should be 
prepared to disclose cybersecurity risk in the following sections of certain periodic reports: “business 
and operations, risk factors, legal proceedings, management’s discussion and analysis of financial 
condition and results of operations . . . financial statements, disclosure controls and procedures, and 
corporate governance.” Id. at 8168. 
 125 Id. at 8167. 
 126 See id. at 8166–67 (noting that cybersecurity concerns affect investors, issuers, the securities 
markets, and the economy at large). 
 127 See id. at 8168–69 (discussing how companies generally assess the materiality of cybersecuri-
ty incidents). 
 128 Id. The SEC, however, did not provide how these factors are to be weighed, or whether others 
should be included. See id. (offering only minimal guidance on ascertaining an entity’s cybersecurity-
related disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws). 
 129 See id. at 8169 (stating that the guidance does not require companies to disclose such detailed 
cybersecurity information to provide a “roadmap” that would help those attempting a cybersecurity 
attack). 
 130 Id. at 8170 (affirming that a company must disclose the involvement of its board of directors 
in managing any material cybersecurity risks to which the company is exposed). Such an obligation 
arises from Item 407(h) of Regulation S–K and Item 7 of Schedule 14A, which mandate disclosure of 
the nature of a board of director’s oversight of a company’s risk. Id. Such oversight includes, for ex-
ample, “how the board administers its oversight function and the effect this has on the board’s leader-
ship structure.” Id. 
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the incidents’ materiality to investors.131 The SEC cited specific regulations that 
require companies to adopt such policies and procedures.132 The guidance, how-
ever, did not identify specific cybersecurity controls and procedures that issuers 
should or could adopt to prevent cybersecurity incidents from occurring.133 
The 2018 guidance also discussed the intersection of cybersecurity and 
insider trading.134 It noted that information relating to cybersecurity may con-
stitute material nonpublic information, and that companies should therefore 
carefully consider their insider trading policies to ensure no trading occurs 
based on this information.135 In light of the sensitive implications of cyberse-
curity incidents for SEC registrants, the 2018 guidance cautioned against selec-
tive disclosure of material information concerning cybersecurity.136 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Id. at 8167. Such policies and procedures should act like an “‘early warning system’ to enable 
companies to determine” if a periodic report, such as a Current Report on Form 8-K, ought to be filed 
with the SEC. EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, supra note 123. 
 132 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8171 (citing various regulations that define and require “disclosure controls and proce-
dures”). For example, Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15 mandate that SEC-regulated companies 
adopt “disclosure controls and procedures” and, further, that managements routinely assess their effi-
cacy. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, .15d-15). “Disclosure controls and procedures” are controls 
and procedures that seek to confirm that information an issuer is required to disclose in periodic re-
ports under the Exchange Act is amassed and disclosed in a timely manner consistent with the SEC’s 
rules and is similarly amassed and reported to an issuer’s management in a timeframe that enables 
such timely disclosure (if management determines public disclosure is required). Id. 
 133 See id. (describing company policies and procedures pertaining to cybersecurity, but not 
providing concrete examples of these policies and procedures). 
 134 See id. at 8171–72 (discussing cybersecurity’s implications for insider trading). 
 135 Id. at 8171; see Newman, supra note 122 (summarizing the SEC’s 2018 interpretive guid-
ance). Insider trading is the unlawful practice whereby corporate insiders—such as officers, directors, 
or majority stockholders—trade securities based on material nonpublic information that would change 
the decision of the outsider had she been aware of said information. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (providing that the insiders’ failure to disclose material information to those 
with whom they deal creates liability under the federal securities laws). The insider either must dis-
close the material, nonpublic information or refrain from trading. Id. 
 136 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8172 (instructing SEC-regulated entities not to disclose selectively nonpublic information 
about cybersecurity incidents to individuals covered by Regulation FD—the SEC’s fair disclosure 
regulation—prior to sharing that same information with the public). Regulation FD prohibits selective 
disclosure—disclosing material nonpublic information to certain enumerated individuals without also 
disclosing that information to the public at large. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100; see Commission Statement and 
Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8172 (explaining Regulation 
FD). Regulation FD mandates that issuers that disclose material nonpublic information to certain 
individuals—brokers, dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, or stockholders when it is 
reasonably foreseeable the stockholders will make trading decisions based on the information—are 
required to disclose that same information to the public. Commission Statement and Guidance on 
Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8172 n.65 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 243.100). 
The SEC promulgated Regulation FD to address the possibility that companies would disclose materi-
al nonpublic information to specific individuals before making that same information available to the 
public. Id. at 8172. Such selective disclosure would allow those privy to the information either to 
profit from the information, or to avoid loss. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000). Regulation FD thereby seeks to 
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In April 2018, the SEC brought its first enforcement action for insuffi-
cient cybersecurity disclosure against the company formerly known as Ya-
hoo!.137 In December 2014, hackers breached the Yahoo! database and misap-
propriated the sensitive information of hundreds of millions of users.138 De-
spite senior management learning of the breach within several days, Yahoo! 
did not disclose the existence of the breach to its investors through SEC filings 
until over two years later.139 The SEC’s complaint stated that Yahoo! was neg-
ligent in failing to make timely disclosure of the breach and for submitting 
misleading filings to the SEC.140 Yahoo! ultimately settled with the SEC, 
agreeing to pay a thirty-five million dollar fine.141 
                                                                                                                           
prevent insider trading. See id. (noting that prior to Regulation FD, those who received advanced 
notice of certain sensitive corporate information—such as earnings results—either profited or escaped 
a loss to the detriment of those not privy to the same information). 
 137 See Newman, supra note 122 (describing the SEC’s enforcement action against Altaba Inc., 
formerly known as Yahoo!). 
 138 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Altaba, Formerly Known as Yahoo!, Charged with 
Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees to Pay $35 Million (Apr. 24, 2018), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71[https://perma.cc/U2AJ-3JT5]; see Newman, supra note 122 
(outlining the SEC’s complaint and the underlying breach of the Yahoo! systems). 
 139 Press Release, supra note 138; see Yahoo! Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 22, 2016) 
(disclosing the breach to the SEC, and by extension to investors). On the same day Yahoo! disclosed 
the breach, its stock price fell three percentage points. Newman, supra note 122. It also caused Veri-
zon Communications, Inc., which was in the process of acquiring the Yahoo!, to reduce its acquisition 
price by $350 million. Id. 
 140 Newman, supra note 122. After learning of the breach, Yahoo! filed numerous periodic re-
ports with the SEC, including quarterly and annual reports, in which the company failed to disclose 
the existence of the breach. Press Release, supra note 138. In lieu of disclosing the breach, Yahoo! 
asserted only that it faced the risk of cybersecurity breaches, as well as any associated adverse impact. 
Id. The SEC stated that Yahoo! informed neither its auditors nor outside counsel about the breach, 
actions it could have taken to ascertain the company’s potential obligations to disclose under the fed-
eral securities laws. Id. Lastly, the SEC cited Yahoo!’s policies and procedures as inadequate to en-
sure that reports of cybersecurity incidents, or the risk of their potential occurrence, were considered 
in a timely fashion for possible disclosure in SEC filings. Id. 
 141 Press Release, supra note 138. Yahoo!, however, neither admitted nor denied the charges in 
the SEC’s complaint. Id. In addition to the SEC litigation, former officers and directors of Yahoo! also 
agreed to settle shareholder derivative lawsuits initiated in response to the breach. Craig A. Newman, 
Lessons for Corporate Boardrooms from Yahoo’s Cybersecurity Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/business/dealbook/yahoo-cyber-security-settlement.html 
[https://perma.cc/TT4P-DH6N]; see Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) 
(explaining that a derivative action is a suit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation and 
thus any damages belong to the corporation). The lawsuits alleged that Yahoo!’s former officers and 
directors breached their fiduciary duties to the company by failing to make timely disclosure of the 
cybersecurity incidents, as well as by hiding the incidents from shareholders. Stipulation and Agree-
ment of Settlement at 9, In re Yahoo! Inc. Shareholder Litig. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2018) (17-CV-
307054); Newman, supra. The settlement represented the first time shareholders successfully recov-
ered monetary damages in derivative litigation resulting from a data breach. Newman, supra. In Janu-
ary 2019, a superior court judge in Santa Clara, California approved the settlement, pursuant to which 
former officers and directors of Yahoo! were ordered to pay twenty-nine million dollars, with eighteen 
million dollars ultimately going to Yahoo!’s successor-in interest, Altaba. Id. (noting that the settle-
ment’s remaining eleven million dollars will go to legal counsel). With respect to cybersecurity inci-
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEC’S REGULATION OF CYBERSECURITY 
Given the devastating consequences—financial and otherwise—of cyber-
security incidents, many industry leaders have stressed the importance of cy-
bersecurity to American companies.142 In recent years, the SEC has increased 
its attention to cybersecurity issues, a trend that is expected to continue.143 This 
Part demonstrates that the SEC’s 2018 guidance has implications extending be-
                                                                                                                           
dents, claims not otherwise viable under federal law may be pursued through state law derivative 
actions. Edward A. Morse et al., SEC Cybersecurity Guidelines: Insights into the Utility of Risk Fac-
tor Disclosures for Investors, 73 BUS. LAW. 1, 18 (2018) (discussing the state law theory that can be 
utilized to pursue cases stemming from cybersecurity incidents). Like Yahoo!, Marriott also faces 
derivative liability in the wake of the recently disclosed breach of the Starwood guest reservation data-
base. Jennifer Bennett, Marriott Hit with Derivative Suit Over Massive Data Breach, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
18, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XF46GBAK000000?bna_news_filter=securities-
law&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016991bad8f7ab7dd9ff047d0002#jcite [https://perma.cc/8YZ9-BJH2]. 
 142 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE COST 
OF MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 1 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7SFA-6FRA] (estimating that the United States suffered losses between $57 and $109 bil-
lion in 2016 due to cyberattacks); see also Clayton, supra note 11 (citing the importance of cybersecu-
rity to various actors, including market participants and investors); Benjamin Dynkin & Barry Dynkin, 
Derivative Liability in the Wake of a Cyber Attack, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 23, 24, 26 (2018) (high-
lighting the potential for derivative lawsuits in the aftermath of cybersecurity attacks). Cyberattacks 
implicate various forms of sensitive information; when companies are hacked, customer information, 
intellectual property, and financial data, among others, are compromised. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVIS-
ERS, supra. The personal data of over two billion people—representing approximately two-thirds of 
online services users—has been compromised or stolen. MCAFEE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE ECO-
NOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME—NO SLOWING DOWN 1 (2018), https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/
en-us/assets/executive-summaries/es-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8QM-8CJJ]. 
In 2018, while the global average cost to a business that experienced a data breach was $3.86 million, 
in the United States the average cost was more than double that figure. Niall McCarthy, The Average 
Cost of a Data Breach Is Highest in the U.S., FORBES (July 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
niallmccarthy/2018/07/13/the-average-cost-of-a-data-breach-is-highest-in-the-u-s-infographic/#424b
92592f37 [https://perma.cc/J7VH-FMHD] (citing a 2018 IBM study on the cost of data breaches stat-
ing that cyberattacks in 2018 cost U.S. companies $7.91 million). The associated costs of cyberat-
tacks, however, cannot all be easily quantified. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra, at 6 (high-
lighting the difficulty of quantifying costs such as damage to reputation and theft of intellectual prop-
erty). Hence, cybersecurity is a pressing concern. See Erik Sherman, U.S. CEOs Are More Worried 
About Cybersecurity Than a Possible Recession, YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 17, 2019), https://finance.
yahoo.com/news/u-ceos-more-worried-cybersecurity-131750112.html [https://perma.cc/YM34-CRBV] 
(discussing a survey of more than eight hundred chief executives officers (CEOs), in which CEOs of 
American companies cited cybersecurity as their greatest existential concern in 2019); see also Robert J. 
Jackson Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Corporate Governance: On the Front Lines of Ameri-
ca’s Cyber War (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-jackson-cybersecurity-2018-
03-15#_ftnref3 [https://perma.cc/UWM5-MPWN] (citing cybersecurity as the most important prob-
lem facing today’s companies). A survey in early 2018 revealed that more than two-thirds of corporate 
executives surveyed stated that cybersecurity presented a threat to their companies. Jackson, supra. 
 143 See Newman, supra note 122 (describing the importance of cybersecurity to the SEC’s regula-
tory initiatives in 2018 and emphasizing its 2018 cybersecurity disclosure guidance and enforcement 
actions against companies stemming from cybersecurity incidents). 
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yond the mandatory disclosure regime.144 Section A discusses current arguments 
against the SEC’s growing involvement in cybersecurity regulation.145 Section B 
highlights the debate over the efficacy of the SEC’s disclosure guidance.146 
A. Should the SEC Regulate Cybersecurity? 
The SEC’s ability to regulate cybersecurity flows from its authority to 
regulate the securities industry and to carry out federal securities laws.147 The 
role of the SEC is to ensure both the protection of investors and the integrity of 
exchanges by eliminating abusive conduct.148 In furtherance of these goals, the 
SEC has begun to regulate cybersecurity because of cybersecurity’s implica-
tions for the SEC’s constituents.149 In addition to detrimental financial conse-
quences for affected companies, cybersecurity incidents also have the potential 
to break down the operations of the securities exchanges.150 The risk of suc-
cumbing to a cybersecurity incident has become greater with the increased re-
liance on technology for business operations in the modern era.151 To protect 
its constituents—reporting companies, investors, and the exchanges—from 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See infra notes 147–187 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 147–164 and accompanying text. 
 146 See infra notes 165–187 and accompanying text. 
 147 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018) (vesting the SEC 
with authority to promulgate rules relating to unlawful deceptive practices in the securities exchang-
es); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (describing the authority delegated by 
Congress to the SEC under the Acts to effectuate securities regulation); see also Commission State-
ment and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8168 (providing 
that, pursuant to the mandatory disclosure regime, public companies have a duty to disclose material 
cybersecurity risks). See generally What We Do, supra note 28. 
 148 See What We Do, supra note 28 (identifying investor protection and ensuring fair and efficient 
exchanges as the mission of the SEC). 
 149 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. 8166, 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (introducing interpretive guidance governing the disclosure of 
cybersecurity risks and incidents by public companies regulated by the SEC); Div. of Corp. Fin., su-
pra note 12 (describing the Division of Corporation Finance’s initial approach towards disclosure of 
cybersecurity incidents); see also Clayton, supra note 11 (articulating the approach of the SEC in initiat-
ing its cybersecurity regulatory efforts). See generally Spotlight on Cybersecurity, the SEC and You, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/J9EH-
3V5G] (outlining the SEC’s approach to and recommendations regarding cybersecurity). 
 150 See Clayton, supra note 11 (acknowledging a breach to the SEC’s EDGAR system in 2016); 
see also DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING CORP., SYSTEMIC RISK BAROMETER: 2019 RISK FORECAST 1 
(2018), http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/Press-Room/14590-Systemic-Risk-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZYZ-3UVK] (highlighting a survey in which cybersecurity was identified as the 
greatest risk to the global economy). For greater discussion of the economic implications of cyberse-
curity incidents, see supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 151 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2018, at 14–15 (2018), http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6JE-VPL7] (stating that the frequen-
cy of cybersecurity incidents nearly doubled between 2012 and 2017, and that cybercrime is projected 
to cost industries eight trillion dollars over the next five years). 
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these devastating consequences, the SEC turned its attention to cybersecurity 
risks and incidents.152 
Another important reason for the SEC’s activity in this space is the lack of 
uniform federal privacy laws and absence of comprehensive federal cybersecuri-
ty regulation in the United States.153 Current cybersecurity regulation largely 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8166–67 (discussing the implications and cost of cybersecurity incidents—including 
damage to stock price, litigation costs, and higher premiums for insurance—and introducing clarifica-
tion about a public company’s obligations under the federal securities laws with respect to cybersecu-
rity); Press Release, supra note 120. 
 153 See, e.g., Victoria Conrad, Note, Digital Gold: Cybersecurity Regulations and Establishing 
the Free Trade of Big Data, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV., 295, 315 (2018) (noting that the only 
standardized approach by the federal government vis-á-vis cybersecurity consists of policy coupled 
with a future intent to centralize cybersecurity regulation, but noting the plethora of approaches at the 
state level). In contrast to the approach in the United States, on April 14, 2016, the European Union 
Parliament enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which intended to standardize 
Europe’s laws protecting data privacy. See Data Protection in the EU, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en [https://perma.cc/KRE5-
ENJV] (discussing the enactment of the GDPR). The GDPR came into effect on May 25, 2018. Id. 
The GDPR applies to any company that (1) “processes personal data as part of the activities of one of 
its branches established in the EU,” or (2) is “established outside the EU and is offering goods/
services (paid or for free) or is monitoring the behaviour of individuals in the EU.” Who Does the 
Data Protection Law Apply To?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/application-regulation/who-does-data-
protection-law-apply_en [https://perma.cc/SW96-DPG4]. The GDPR applies regardless of whether 
the data processing takes place within or outside of the European Union. Id. Relevant to the topic of 
this Note, if a company covered by the GDPR experiences a cybersecurity incident, it must notify the 
appropriate authority within seventy-two hours of the breach, unless the incident is not likely to 
“risk . . . the rights and freedoms of natural persons.” Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33. Similarly, the company must 
communicate the existence of the breach to the affected “data subject” when the incident is “likely to 
result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.” Id. at 34. Failure to adhere to the pro-
visions of the GDPR could result in “a range of sanctions, including suspension of activities and fines.” 
Sanctions, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/
rules-business-and-organisations/enforcement-and-sanctions/sanctions_en [https://perma.cc/8GA2-
USDM]. See generally JONES DAY, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION GUIDE (2017), https://
www.jonesday.com/files/upload/GDPR%20Pocket%20Guide%20A5%2004_17_18%20ENGLISH.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3HPN-WVD3] (providing an overview of the GDPR and its implications for 
affected companies and individuals). Stemming from the 2018 breach, Marriott became the second 
company to face a potential financial penalty under the GDPR. See Statement: Intention to Fine Mar-
riott International, Inc More Than £99 Million Under GDPR for Data Breach, INFO. COMMISSION-
ER’S OFF. (July 9, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/
statement-intention-to-fine-marriott-international-inc-more-than-99-million-under-gdpr-for-data-
breach/ [https://perma.cc/9LCT-VK42] (announcing an intention to fine Marriott approximately £99 
million); see also Marriott Int’l, Inc., Exhibit 99 to Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 9, 2019) (disclos-
ing the fine to Marriott investors). British Airways was the first company whose penalty under the 
GDPR was announced publicly. Kate O’Flaherty, Marriott Faces $123 Million Fine for 2018 Mega-
Breach, FORBES (July 9, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/07/09/marriott-
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consists of divergent approaches at the state level.154 Because no single federal 
agency is by statute charged with carrying out cybersecurity regulation, the SEC 
has addressed cybersecurity concerns relevant to its regulatory jurisdiction.155 
Some criticism, however, cautions that providing the SEC with infor-
mation relating to cybersecurity may in fact be harmful.156 In regulating cyber-
security, the SEC requires its constituents to hand over highly sensitive infor-
mation.157 The cybersecurity information a company discloses to the SEC 
could ultimately be used against the company if the SEC’s own cybersecurity 
is compromised and the information is misappropriated by malicious actors.158 
The SEC is not impenetrable—neither physically nor in cyberspace.159 In 
September 2018, a report issued by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) found that the SEC had not adequately maintained constant monitoring 
of the security of its information technology systems.160 The report stated that 
                                                                                                                           
faces-gdpr-fine-of-123-million/#5010a6924525 [https://perma.cc/NZ4B-K7AT] (detailing British 
Airways’ £183 million penalty). 
 154 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 153, at 316–17 (describing the divergent cybersecurity regulatory 
efforts at the state level and noting the significant compliance burden they impose on companies that 
operate across state lines). See generally Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving 
Efficiency Through a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45 (2015) (discussing the patchwork regulatory efforts resulting from 
the state-by-state approach to data protection and data breach notification statutes). 
 155 Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL 
LAW (Oct. 1, 2018), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-502-0467 [https://perma.cc/LGR5-
LJQW] (citing the absence of one central cybersecurity statute and describing the United States’ regu-
latory efforts in this area as “a patchwork system of federal and state laws and regulations that can 
sometimes overlap, dovetail and contradict one another”); see, e.g., Commission Statement and Guid-
ance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. Reg. at 8166 (presenting the SEC’s most 
recent interpretive guidance regarding the disclosure obligations of public companies regarding cyber-
security incidents). 
 156 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 37 (arguing that the cybersecurity information 
the SEC requests from its regulated entities could be “too sensitive” given the SEC’s own cybersecuri-
ty weaknesses). 
 157 Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 8169 (instructing public companies to disclose material information relating to cybersecurity, 
including “disclosure[s] that [are] tailored to their particular cybersecurity risks and incidents”). 
 158 See Press Release, supra note 119 (describing the 2016 breach of the SEC’s EDGAR system, 
which generated over four million dollars in illegal trading profits for the individuals who allegedly 
breached the system). For further discussion of the 2016 breach of EDGAR, see supra note 119 and 
accompany text. 
 159 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 56–57 (discussing a 2014 report issued by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) identifying weaknesses in the SEC’s security); Sarah N. 
Lynch, U.S. SEC’s Information Technology at Risk of Hacking—Report, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2014), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/sec-cybercrime-security-idUSL2N0N91GU20140417 [https://perma.
cc/KDJ3-6CT4] (noting that the 2014 GAO report identified weaknesses in both the SEC’s cybersecu-
rity and physical security). 
 160 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-622, HIGH-RISK SERIES: URGENT ACTIONS 
ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE NATION 62 (2018), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/700/694355.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4AB-EE96] (stating that the SEC “did not 
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despite the GAO bringing this to the SEC’s attention in the previous year, the 
SEC had yet to change its practices.161 Considering whether the SEC should be 
regulating cybersecurity raises questions about the SEC’s own level of cyber-
security protection.162 Despite the fact that the SEC has reassured reporting 
companies that they are not required to be so detailed in disclosure so as to 
provide a “roadmap” of their cybersecurity efforts—lest the information fall 
into the hands of those who would misuse it—critics question the advisability 
of requiring companies to share any cybersecurity information at all.163 Be-
cause cybersecurity information is inherently sensitive, the risk of an incident 
could increase if companies share information with an SEC that cannot guaran-
tee that the information will not become compromised or misappropriated.164 
B. If the SEC Is to Regulate Cybersecurity, Is Disclosure  
the Most Effective Way? 
The SEC’s foray into cybersecurity regulation begs the question of 
whether disclosure is the most effective means by which to regulate growing 
cybersecurity issues.165 In recent years, the SEC has conducted examinations 
of cybersecurity policies and created the Cyber Unit within the Division of 
                                                                                                                           
always keep system security plans complete and accurate or fully implement continuous monitoring, 
as required by agency policy”). 
 161 Id. at 62–63. The report identified other government agencies with information technology 
systems and security deemed to be deficient. See id. at 63 (identifying weaknesses with the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Food and Drug Administration, 
among other agencies). 
 162 See Francine McKenna, SEC’s Case Against Edgar Hackers Highlights Regulator’s Own 
Cyber Weaknesses, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/secs-case-
against-edgar-hackers-highlights-regulators-own-cyber-weaknesses-2019-01-15 [https://perma.cc/
K48J-W53S] (describing the breach of the SEC’s EDGAR system and its implications for the SEC’s 
own cybersecurity efforts). 
 163 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8169 (stating that SEC filers are not required to provide such great detail in cybersecurity 
disclosures so as to give a “roadmap” to would-be hackers); McKenna, supra note 162 (describing 
some criticism of the SEC’s approach to cybersecurity regulation).  
 164 See McKenna, supra note 162 (citing a former member of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement 
who questions whether the SEC should permit companies to include material, nonpublic information 
in test filings with the SEC, in light of the increasing prevalence of cybersecurity incidents). In a re-
cent statement discussing the ongoing enforcement action against the alleged perpetrators, Chairman 
of the SEC Jay Clayton acknowledged that the SEC faces many of the same cybersecurity risks as the 
entities it regulates, and acknowledged that “[n]o system can be entirely safe from a cyber intrusion.” 
Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on EDGAR Hacking Enforcement 
Action (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-011519 [https://
perma.cc/ZT4A-WQ8Y]. 
 165 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 36–37 (describing various means of regulation 
by the SEC, including mandatory disclosure of cybersecurity-related information as well as cyberse-
curity examinations conduct by the SEC’s Office of Compliance and Examinations). 
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Enforcement to combat cybersecurity abuses in the securities markets.166 Con-
sistent with the mandatory disclosure regime, however, the primary method 
through which the SEC has regulated cybersecurity is by requiring public 
companies to disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents in their SEC filings.167 
The SEC has affirmed that under the federal securities laws, public companies 
have a duty to disclose to investors all material information regarding cyberse-
curity risks and incidents.168 Standard boilerplate language in these disclosures 
does not suffice; reporting companies must disclose in appropriate detail the 
specific cybersecurity risks to which the company is exposed, as well as any 
incidents to which it has succumbed.169 In order to do so effectively, the SEC 
expects a public company to develop controls and procedures designed to dis-
cern cybersecurity risks and incidents, evaluate their effect on the company’s 
operations, and asses their potential materiality.170 To ensure timely and appro-
priate disclosure, the policies and procedures must also ensure that this infor-
mation is reported to the correct company personnel.171 
Proponents of the SEC’s regulatory efforts in this area cite investor pro-
tection, one of the most commonly cited rationales for the mandatory disclo-
sure regime, as an important justification for cybersecurity disclosure obliga-
tions.172 An investor is better able to assess her investment in a particular re-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Press Release, supra note 120 (announcing the creation and purpose of the SEC’s Cyber 
Unit); see also Spotlight on Cybersecurity, the SEC and You, supra note 149 (noting that cybersecuri-
ty is a major focus of an SEC examination). For more detailed discussion of the Cyber Unit within the 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement, see supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
 167 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8168–70 (discussing the rules promulgated under the federal securities law that do not 
explicitly mention cybersecurity but nonetheless compel disclosure of material cybersecurity risks and 
incidents). 
 168 See id. at 8167 (instructing public companies to disclose to investors those cybersecurity risks 
and incidents that are material and to do so in a “timely fashion”). 
 169 Id. at 8169 (describing the materiality standard as it applies to cybersecurity issues and cau-
tioning reporting companies to provide meaningful cybersecurity disclosure for investors, rather than 
boilerplate language); see Press Release, supra note 138 (stating that Yahoo! failed to disclose the 
breach to which it succumbed in 2014; instead it only disclosed that it faced a risk of cybersecurity 
incidents). 
 170 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8171 (discussing the cybersecurity disclosure controls and procedures that a public com-
pany is expected to maintain pursuant the federal securities laws). The SEC further provided that such 
policies and procedures seek to allow a reporting company to detect, assess for materiality, and make 
timely disclosure of cybersecurity risks and incidents. Id. 
 171 See id. (noting that a public company’s controls and procedures should aggregate and report 
cybersecurity-related information to the proper personnel within the company). In effect, the SEC is 
instructing boards and management to take more active roles in their companies’ cybersecurity efforts. 
See id. (noting that policies should facilitate the sharing of cybersecurity-related information with “the 
appropriate personnel, including up the corporate ladder”). 
 172 See Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 390 (2014) (citing investor protection 
as the goal of federal regulation); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing the protection of investors as 
the purpose of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act); Morse et al., supra note 141, at 10 
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porting company when that company provides full and truthful disclosure of 
the cybersecurity risks and incidents it faces.173 Moreover, given the financial 
consequences, among other implications, of cybersecurity incidents, these in-
cidents are likely considered to be material.174 Stated differently, an investor is 
likely to consider the existence of cybersecurity risks or incidents to be a sig-
nificant factor when making an investment-related decision.175 
There are, however, some criticisms of the SEC’s mandatory disclosure 
approach to cybersecurity.176 Although all SEC Commissioners unanimously 
approved the 2018 guidance, then-Commissioner Kara Stein stated that the 
guidance simply repeated much of the substance of the 2011 guidance.177 Stein 
provided several examples of alternative steps the SEC could have taken, such 
as tailoring the new guidance to reflect relevant information the SEC had 
learned since its staff issued the 2011 guidance.178 Likewise, then-SEC Com-
missioner Robert J. Jackson Jr. stated that the 2018 guidance merely recycles 
                                                                                                                           
(stating that information pertaining to cybersecurity is the kind of information about which investors 
would want to be informed). By providing investors with full and accurate disclosure, an investor is 
empowered to make an informed decision regarding her position in the company, improving market 
efficiency. See, e.g., Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 343 (stating that the mandatory disclosure regime 
increases investors’ access to accurate information, thereby protecting investors from exploitation). 
 173 See Forrest E. Lind III, Governing Cybersecurity: The SEC Enters the Ring, 3 EMORY CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 2032, 2035 (2016) (stating that disclosure of cybersecurity-
related information enables investors to make informed decisions regarding their investments); Turk 
& Woody, supra note 32, at 969 nn.49, 52 (expounding upon the underlying premise of the mandatory 
disclosure regime). 
 174 See Lind, supra note 173 (stating that cybersecurity risks and incidents are the type of infor-
mation needed to assess accurately an investment opportunity and about which investors would want 
to be informed). 
 175 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8168 & n.32 (describing the SEC’s standard of materiality for disclosures under the fed-
eral securities laws and its consistency with the materiality standard put forth by the Supreme Court in 
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway); see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(providing that a fact is material if a reasonable investor would either be significantly likely to consid-
er it critical in making a decision about her investments, or would have considered it to change signif-
icantly the amount of information provided to the investor). 
 176 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 56–57 (arguing that the SEC’s regulation of 
cybersecurity is problematic due to its own cyber-related vulnerabilities); Craig A. Newman, When to 
Report a Cyberattack? For Companies, That’s Still a Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/dealbook/sec-cybersecurity-guidance.html [https://perma.cc/
EDC7-CGS3] (describing the difficulties and tensions public companies experience when determining 
whether to disclose cybersecurity-related information and stating that the guidance does not help to 
balance the decisions of working with law enforcement and informing investors). 
 177 Stein, supra note 16. Stein’s term expired on January 2, 2019. SEC Historical Summary of 
Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/
sechistoricalsummary.htm [https://perma.cc/RR7G-Y6P5]. 
 178 See Stein, supra note 16 (offering examples of other regulatory initiatives the SEC could have 
undertaken). 
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the content of its predecessor and that cybersecurity regulation must instead be 
extended further.179 
Another criticism is that the SEC’s guidance does little to clarify when a 
reporting company’s obligations with respect to cybersecurity arise under the 
mandatory disclosure regime.180 Although the SEC’s guidance stresses the 
need for “timely” disclosure, it does not expand upon what makes disclosure 
“timely.”181 The 2018 guidance is seen as too general, and leaves reporting 
companies wondering whether disclosure of a cybersecurity incident can wait 
until the end of the quarter, whether it can wait until the end of the fiscal year, 
or whether it must be made immediately in a Current Report Form 8-K.182 
Lastly, although the guidance asserts that public companies are not re-
quired to provide such detail in their disclosures that their cybersecurity efforts 
could be compromised, critics question the feasibility of complying with the 
disclosure requirements without compromising a company’s cybersecurity.183 
For example, a company that discloses a cybersecurity risk particular to its 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Commission 
Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.
sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-2018-02-21 [https://perma.cc/2Q7K-4K4D] (“I 
reluctantly support today’s guidance in the hope that it is just the first step toward defeating those who 
would use technology to threaten our economy.”). In early 2020, Commissioner Jackson announced 
his exit from the SEC. Paul Kiernan, SEC Commissioner Jackson Resigns to Return to Law School 
Teaching Position, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-commissioner-
jackson-resigns-to-return-to-law-school-teaching-position-11579183208 [https://perma.cc/QG5G-
2ZTH]. 
 180 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 142, at 31 (discussing concerns that the SEC’s 
2011 guidance does not enable firms to determine what quantity of information to provide in disclo-
sure, and hence does not resolve the information imbalance the mandatory disclosure regime seeks to 
address); Newman, supra note 176 (asserting that the SEC’s 2018 guidance does little to help report-
ing companies ascertain when to disclose a cybersecurity incident). The Council of Economic Advis-
ers further discussed the dearth of disclosures of cybersecurity incidents and the policy implications of 
this lack of data. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 142, at 32. 
 181 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8167–72 (repeatedly asserting the need for public companies to make “timely” disclosure 
of material cybersecurity-related information, but failing to further clarify any timeframe); Monica 
Pal, Why Don’t Companies Come Clean After a Data Breach?, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Feb. 10, 
2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2019/02/06/4iq-ceo-monica-pal-data-breaches-op-
ed.html [https://perma.cc/AV96-44C7] (arguing that public companies face a choice between making 
disclosure soon after a breach, when they may not have all the necessary information, and waiting to 
disclose, resulting in more accurate disclosure). 
 182 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 142, at 31 (citing concerns that the SEC’s guid-
ance is “too general”); Newman, supra note 176 (stating that the SEC’s new guidance neither fully 
appreciates nor clarifies the conflict public companies experience when faced with the question of 
whether to disclose cybersecurity incidents). 
 183 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8169 (stating that a reporting company is not required in its disclosures with the SEC to 
offer such granularity as to offer a “roadmap” of how to exploit the company’s cybersecurity vulnera-
bilities); Morse et al., supra note 141, at 9–10 (discussing the cybersecurity implications inherent in a 
company’s compliance with disclosures under SEC cybersecurity guidance). 
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business is, in effect, disclosing that an investment with the company is risky 
because of cybersecurity concerns.184 Moreover, even if the company does not 
provide a roadmap to those who would potentially use the information for ne-
farious purposes, disclosure of cybersecurity risks is a signal to the public that 
the company is vulnerable, and could succumb to an attack.185 Some scholars 
note that even a generalized disclosure of cybersecurity concerns—which the 
SEC stated in its guidance is not permitted—could expose the company to fur-
ther risk.186 The more information a company discloses to investors, commen-
tators assert, the greater the chance that information could ultimately find its 
way into the hands of those who will exploit it: hackers.187 
III. THE SEC MUST FURTHER EXPLAIN, RATHER THAN REPEAT, ITS 
REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY DISCLOSURE 
Because of the consequences for individual reporting companies and the 
securities markets at large, the SEC is properly taking a stance on the issue of 
cybersecurity.188 In initiating regulatory efforts in this area, the SEC has taken 
another step to further its mission of investor protection and market regula-
tion.189 Cybersecurity regulation furthers investor protection because, through 
the mandatory disclosure regime upon which federal securities regulation is 
premised, the SEC ensures investors are appropriately informed about the cy-
bersecurity risks of the companies in which they invest.190 The SEC imple-
                                                                                                                           
 184 Morse et al., supra note 141, at 9. 
 185 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8169 (attempting to qualify the level of detail required to fulfill a company’s reporting 
obligations with respect to cybersecurity); Morse et al., supra note 141, at 9–10 (discussing the mes-
sage of vulnerability that a company presents when making disclosure relating to cybersecurity). 
 186 See Howard M. Privette et al., The SEC Guidance on Cybersecurity Measures for Public 
Companies, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 14, 15 (noting that former SEC-commissioner Roberta Karmel 
suggested that disclosure of cybersecurity risks at all is contrary to the public interest by bringing 
those issues to light for exploitation by hackers). In effect, disclosure of cybersecurity-related issues 
could expose the company to greater risk. See id. at 17 (discussing both the risk that disclosure will 
exacerbate future cyberattacks against the company and the risk that such disclosure will generate 
additional shareholder derivative litigation). For greater discussion of derivative litigation, see supra 
note 141 and accompanying text. 
 187 See Privette et al., supra note 186, at 14 (describing the conundrum companies face: investors 
are likely interested in receiving disclosure of cybersecurity incidents and risks, but providing disclo-
sure in too much detail would reveal vulnerabilities of the company that may end up in the hands of 
hackers). 
 188 See Clayton, supra note 11 (asserting that investors ultimately internalize much of the cost of 
cybersecurity incidents). 
 189 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 61 (describing how the SEC furthers its mission 
of market regulation and investor protection in its regulation of cybersecurity). 
 190 See id. (asserting that the required disclosure of only material cybersecurity incidents ensures 
that investors obtain the information they need without compromising a company’s security); Thomp-
son & Sale, supra note 28, at 869–70 (stating that federal securities regulation aims to correct the 
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ments market regulation by ridding cybersecurity-related abuses from the mar-
ket—in particular through the Division of Enforcement’s Cyber Unit.191 
Although the SEC is rightly taking strides to address cybersecurity con-
cerns, to be effective it must: (1) resolve its own cybersecurity flaws; and (2) 
further clarify the scope of the disclosure obligations by explaining what 
makes a cybersecurity incident “material” and what constitutes “timely” dis-
closure.192 Section A argues that the SEC must shore up its own cybersecurity 
measures to effectively regulate the cybersecurity of its reporting compa-
nies.193 Section B asserts that the SEC must further explain, and not simply 
reiterate, the disclosure requirements pertaining to cybersecurity.194 
A. Flaws in the SEC’s Own Cybersecurity Prevent It from Effectively 
Ensuring the Cybersecurity of Its Regulated Entities 
Recent reports have highlighted the flaws in the SEC’s approach to its 
own cybersecurity.195 Not only have the SEC’s own databases succumbed to 
cybersecurity incidents, but the GAO has labeled the SEC’s cybersecurity 
measures as inadequate.196 Although the SEC is properly taking a stance in this 
area, the SEC will only exacerbate current cybersecurity concerns if its own 
cybersecurity is compromised again.197 A company’s risk of experiencing a 
cyberattack is amplified, rather than decreased, by reporting its own cyberse-
                                                                                                                           
informational asymmetry between companies and investors by requiring companies to make substan-
tial disclosures to investors through SEC filings). 
 191 See Press Release, supra note 120 (announcing that the Cyber Unit will be tasked with ridding 
the market of cyber-related misconduct, such as “[h]acking to obtain material nonpublic information” 
or “[c]yber-related threats to trading platforms and other critical market infrastructure”). 
 192 See infra notes 195–215 and accompanying text. 
 193 See infra notes 195–201 and accompanying text. 
 194 See infra notes 202–215 and accompanying text. 
 195 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 160, at 62–63 (discussing ongoing 
flaws with the cybersecurity measures employed by the SEC); Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, 
at 56–57 (describing a 2014 GAO report that highlighted two overarching areas in which the SEC’s 
cybersecurity measures are lacking: “(1) maintenance and monitoring of configuration baseline stand-
ards; and (2) implementation of password setting and network service standards”). In 2018, four years 
after the 2014 report, another GAO report asserted that the SEC still had some inadequate security 
measures, even though the GAO had previously brought these deficiencies to the SEC’s attention. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 160, at 62–63. 
 196 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 160, at 62–63 (noting that some of the 
cybersecurity methods deployed by the SEC are deficient, despite earlier warnings from the GAO 
about such deficiencies); Press Release, supra note 119 (announcing that hackers infiltrated the SEC’s 
EDGAR system in 2016). 
 197 See Press Release, supra note 119 (describing the 2016 hack of EDGAR). The hack of the 
SEC’s EDGAR system, for example, enabled the hacking parties to trade on material information that 
was submitted to the SEC but not yet made public. Id. In total, the individuals amassed more than four 
million dollars in unlawful trading profits. Id. This abuse is exactly of the type that the SEC seeks to 
prevent. See What We Do, supra note 28 (stating that “protecting against fraud” is a responsibility of 
SEC). 
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curity risks to the SEC because of the SEC’s imperfect cybersecurity sys-
tems.198 If the sensitive cybersecurity-related information given to the SEC—
whether through disclosure or examinations—is misappropriated, the SEC’s 
efficacy in keeping such information secure and out of the wrong hands is 
thwarted.199 Consequently, if the SEC is going to require public companies to 
hand over highly sensitive information, the SEC must practice what it preach-
es.200 Moving forward, the SEC must make its own cybersecurity a priority, 
particularly in light of recent well-publicized breaches to its own systems.201 
B. The SEC Must Further Clarify Reporting Companies’ Disclosure 
Obligations of Cybersecurity Risks and Incidents 
To date, the SEC has implemented its regulation of cybersecurity largely 
through its mandatory disclosure regime.202 The SEC has asserted that the enti-
ties it regulates must disclose material cybersecurity risks and incidents, and 
must do so in a timely fashion.203 The SEC has not, however, clearly articulat-
ed what makes a cybersecurity risk or incident material.204 Consequently, pub-
lic companies often disclose copious amounts of information in their filings, in 
some instances burying information that is likely to be material under infor-
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 61 (“Publicly reporting cybersecurity manage-
ment policy and storing sensitive examination information in insecure SEC technology infrastructure 
increase the risk of cyberattacks.”). 
 199 See id. (arguing that reporting cybersecurity and other sensitive information to the SEC to then 
be stored in unsecure systems exacerbates the risk of succumbing to cybersecurity incidents). 
 200 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 160, at 3 (stating that the report pin-
points changes that federal agencies, including the SEC, must implement to strengthen the agencies’ 
cybersecurity profiles); Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 56–57 (describing the SEC’s cyber-
security shortcomings and arguing that the SEC should take steps to protect the sensitive information 
that it, by virtue of its work, must collect). 
 201 See Press Release, supra note 119 (noting that individuals who successfully breached EDGAR 
garnered more than four million dollars in illegal trading profits). 
 202 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-10459, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166, 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (representing the 
SEC’s most recent guidance on the reporting requirements regarding cybersecurity imposed on public 
companies by the federal securities laws and the regulations promulgated thereunder). 
 203 Id. at 8168 (asserting that public companies must disclose to investors those material cyberse-
curity risks and incidents, even though the requisite disclosure requirements do not speak directly to 
cybersecurity-related issues). 
 204 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8168–69 (articulating the standard of materiality and how it relates to cybersecurity-
related issues). Although the SEC mentioned the well-known standard of materiality—if a reasonable 
investor is substantially likely to view the information as significant in making an investment-related 
determination—the SEC did not provide examples of the kinds of incidents that would satisfy the 
standard. Id. The SEC identified numerous factors that a company should consider in deciding wheth-
er an incident is material, but provided no concrete examples of those factors. See id. (stating that 
factors such as “nature, extent, and potential magnitude” influence whether a cybersecurity incident is 
material). 
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mation that is less pertinent.205 Over-disclosing information to investors ren-
ders ineffective the investor-protection centered model of securities regulation 
because, by inundating investors with information, they are unable to discern 
what information matters to their investment decisions.206 The SEC, therefore, 
must provide more clarity about what types of events, and at what scale, meet 
the materiality standard and, therefore, must be disclosed in SEC filings.207 
With a better understanding of what incidents and risks are material, public 
companies can more clearly disclose them to investors, thereby furthering the 
aims of the federal securities laws.208 
Moreover, the SEC has not provided a clear timeframe to which a public 
company is expected to adhere in disclosing cybersecurity concerns.209 A clear-
ly laid out timeframe would have helped to prevent Marriott from waiting over 
two months to disclose a large cybersecurity breach of one of its databases.210 
Likewise, it would provide all companies with a clear yardstick by which to 
measure the timeliness of their disclosures.211 Investors would receive more 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 13, at 55 (quoting Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report 
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 15, 2013)) (highlighting one example of disclosure in which a company stated that 
“[l]ike other global companies, we have, from time to time, experienced threats to our data and sys-
tems, including malware and computer virus attacks, unauthorized access, systems failures and disrup-
tions,” and arguing that an investor is unable to discern the true and relevant meaning of such disclo-
sure). 
 206 See Mastronardi, supra note 10, at 344 (describing a common refrain that imposing too many 
disclosure obligations upon companies may inevitably overwhelm investors with so much information 
that they will be unable to determine the relevancy of the provided information). 
 207 See Newman, supra note 176 (critiquing the SEC’s 2018 guidance for doing little to help pub-
lic companies sort through the “conflicting demands” implicated by cybersecurity incidents: remain-
ing discreet about cybersecurity incidents in order to cooperate with the law enforcement officials 
tasked with investigating them, while also maintaining the company’s obligations to disclose material 
information to investors). 
 208 See Shelby, supra note 33 (stating that the purpose of investor protection underlying the feder-
al securities laws is furthered by requiring public companies to disclose information pertaining to 
numerous areas of the companies’ businesses, thereby preventing investor exploitation and other abu-
sive practices); Newman, supra note 176 (suggesting that a lack of clarity and guidance from the SEC 
could represent why so few companies have disclosed cybersecurity incidents in filings with the 
SEC). 
 209 See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 8167 (confirming that companies have an obligation to disclose cybersecurity risks and 
incidents in a “timely fashion”). In the 2018 guidance, the SEC repeatedly asserts the need for “time-
ly” disclosure, but does not provide further explanation of what satisfies this requirement. See id. at 
8167–72 (providing no clarification on what constitutes “timely” disclosure); Pal, supra note 181 
(asserting that the SEC’s 2018 guidance forces companies to balance prompt disclosure with correct 
disclosure). 
 210 See Marriott Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 30, 2018) (representing the first 
disclosure Marriott made to investors in November 2018 regarding the cybersecurity incident it dis-
covered in September 2018, representing a delay of more than two months). 
 211 See Rajgopal & Gezer, supra note 6 (noting that the lack of specificity in the SEC’s current 
cybersecurity disclosure guidance enables companies to delay disclosure of cybersecurity risks and 
incidents). 
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timely and accurate information as to the cybersecurity risks and incidents 
faced by the companies in which they are invested.212 Moreover, given that the 
size and scope of an incident may not be immediately apparent, a timeframe is 
particularly important because, to date, there has been a wide variation of how 
swift, or slow, companies are to disclose cybersecurity incidents.213 
Consequently, although the SEC has emphasized the need for disclosure—
an important first step in requiring public companies to take seriously the cyber-
security threats they face—some aspects of the SEC’s regulatory efforts require 
further clarification.214 To ensure adequate market regulation and investor pro-
tection, the SEC must help companies help themselves by specifying when to 
disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents and what information to provide.215 
CONCLUSION 
Cybersecurity is a grave threat to publicly-traded companies and the 
economy at large. Consequently, the SEC has turned its regulatory attention to 
issues pertaining to cybersecurity. Pursuant to its authority to carry out the fed-
eral securities laws, which seek to protect investors and regulate the securities 
exchanges, the SEC has carried out cybersecurity regulation primarily through 
its mandatory disclosure regime. Although no SEC requirements speak specifi-
cally to cybersecurity, SEC guidance issued in 2018 explains that public com-
panies nonetheless must disclose in a timely fashion those cybersecurity risks 
and incidents that are material to investors. The substance of this guidance, 
however, merely parroted statements from 2011 guidance issued by the SEC’s 
Division of Corporation Finance and left companies unsure of their disclosure 
obligations. 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See id. (asserting that greater clarity in the disclosure obligations would ensure companies take 
such risks seriously and disclose them as needed to investors). 
 213 See Pal, supra note 181 (providing as an example Facebook’s announcement that some fifty 
million user accounts had been compromised three days after the hack occurred, when the company 
had only just commenced an investigation). Although Facebook later provided updates regarding the 
breach, stating that it affected approximately twenty million fewer users than initially estimated, it 
also revealed that the stolen information was more personal than initially believed. Mike Isaac, Face-
book Hack Included Search History and Location Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/technology/facebook-hack-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/372S-
MMTX]. In its 2018 guidance, the SEC acknowledged that later updates to an initial disclosure of a 
cybersecurity incident may be necessary to account for information learned after the disclosure. See 
Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. at 
8169 (instructing reporting companies to assess whether updates to previously issued disclosure are 
needed, particularly when a cybersecurity incident is being investigated). 
 214 See Jackson, supra note 142 (stating that companies that succumbed to cybersecurity incidents 
in 2017 opted not to file a Form 8-K in over ninety-seven percent of circumstances, and noting that he 
has urged the SEC to put forth new obligations regarding cybersecurity disclosure for Form 8-Ks). 
 215 See Stein, supra note 16 (stating that the SEC’s 2018 guidance simply parroted positions put 
forth in 2011 and pointing to other, more forward-looking actions the SEC could have taken with 
respect to cybersecurity disclosure). 
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Although the SEC has appropriately focused on cybersecurity given its 
significant implications, to be truly effective in the space the SEC must take 
two steps. First, the SEC must strengthen its own cybersecurity: requesting 
cybersecurity information from regulated entities should not, as is currently the 
case, increase risk that those entities will be exposed to cybersecurity threats. 
Second, the SEC must provide greater explanation of what makes a cybersecu-
rity incident material—and thus worthy of disclosure—and what constitutes 
“timely” disclosure of cybersecurity incidents. Only with further clarity can the 
SEC achieve meaningful regulation in the cybersecurity space. 
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